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"Once, I remember, we came upon a man-of-war anchored off the
coast. There wasn't even a shed there, and she was shelling the bush. .
. .
Her ensign dropped limp like a rag; the muzzles of long six-inch guns stuck
out all over the low hull; the greasy, slimy swell swung her up lazily and let
her down, swaying her thin masts. In the empty immensity of earth, sky,
and water, there she was, incomprehensible, firing into a continent. Pop
would go one of the six-inch guns; a small flame would dart and vanish, a
little white smoke would disappear, a tiny projectile would give a feeble
screech—and nothing happened. Nothing could happen."
—Joseph Conrad, ffttf/t tf Mrlxess
"The best Ambassador is a Man -of War."
--Oliver Cromwell

Gunboat Diplomacy in a New World Order:
Strategic Considerations for U.S. Naval Intervention
in the Twenty-First Century
I. INTRODUCTION
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact the
threat of global war has all but been eliminated. At the same time, the
Third World is experiencing a rising tide of instability, brought about by
economic and social inequities, religious fundamentalism, and resurgent
ethnic and political rivalries—and fuelled by increasing military capabilities
caused by the proliferation of advanced-technology weapons. As a result of
these changes, U.S. security strategy is turning from its Cold War focus on
global containment to the protection of U.S. interests against regional
instabilities.
The most dramatic confirmation of this change in direction was the
announcement by the President on 2 August 1990 of a new National Security
Strategy which would focus on maintaining stability and responding to
regional crises, rather than on preparing for a global conflict, against the
Soviet Union. This strategy was to be based on four elements—deterrence,
forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution of forces--and
predicated on the assumption that there would be adequate warning of
Soviet rescidivisrn to allow for the restructuring of a globally -capable U.S.
military force. Barring a return to Cold War status between die two major

powers, the principle threat to future U.S. interests was determined to lie in
regional instabilities throughout the world.
One of the most far-reaching effects of this realignment of U.S.
security strategy is the potential it holds for altering U.S. involvement in the
Third World. Where the U.S. once judged political events in the Third World
as they related to the broader context of U.S. -Soviet relations, that no longer
needs to be a principal determinant for U.S. policy. Freed of the strategic
necessitv to view every regional crisis as an emerging East-West
battleground, die United States now has the freedom to make realistic
judgments about the importance of Third World events to the vital interests
of the nation.
In determining priorities for a potential use of U.S. military force in
the future, several questions may now be addressed which have heretofore
been overshadowed by larger strategic considerations. In which areas of the
world do U. S. interests truly lie? When should U.S. forces be sent to protect
those interests? In which crises and with what urgency must U.S. forces be
prepared to intervene, and how much "stability" should they be prepared to
impose? Most important, does every world conflict or crisis require a
military response from the United States? Is stability everywhere always in
the national interest? Is instability anvwhere always detrimental to theit f
national interest?
Independent of improvements in East-West relations, the changes
in the world political structure demand that the United States reevaluate its
relationship to the Third World. The recent invasion of Kuwait by Iraq--and
the unprecedented military coalition which it sparked—has altered the
strategic landscape no less radically than the dissolution of the Soviet
empire. In a world in which a single "Third ¥/orld" nation can threaten

control over strategic resources, in which virtually every nation has the
opportunity to acquire the world's most advanced military hardware, and in
which defense coalitions cross cultural, economic, religious, and political
lines, the most important question, from a political and military standpoint,
may be whether there is still such a thing as a "Third World" nation?
For the U. S. Navy these are questions of no small consequence. As
the vanguard of U. S. presence overseas, and the most visible symbol of U. S.
commitment to its international responsibilities, the Navy operates daily at
the fringes of the Third World. To misjudge the nature of "the threat" in a
regional crisis, or to miscalculate the means required to counter it, is to
endanger a ship and its crew. Worse yet, miscalculation can result in the
sort of action (or inaction) which would seriously prejudice the vital interests
of the nation.
Since the end of World War II, the United States has dispatched
the Navy to respond to more than 192 crises worldwide 1 . Yet with forty
years of experience in dealing with regional conflicts, the Navy appears to
have conducted very little structured analysis to determine whether those
operations were correctly executed, or the degree to which they actually
1Figures vary depending on the source of the information. Adam B. Siegel, LL
S. Navy Crisis Response Activity, 1 9 46 • 1959 (Preliminary Report)
(Alexandria: Center for Naval Analysis, 1959) lists 187 incidents. In
contrast, Blechman and Kaplan, Force Without War: U. S. Armed Forces as a
Political Instrurnent (Washington,!). C. : Brookings Institution, 1976), count
2 1^ incidents between 1946 and 1975, of which the Navy participated in
177. Official Navy sources cite 202 instances of naval participation in
incidents excluding the Korean and Vietnam wars. For purposes of this
study the results of the Siegel inventory are considered the standard. This
includes the original figure of 167, plus 5 additional events which have
occurred since that study was published.

served the broader interests of the nation 2 Still less often has there been
any attempt to lay out a strategy for the use of limited naval power
overseas, or to define what should be achieved in doing so.
Understanding these issues is central to determining how the Navy
can best be used in the future to protect the nation's interests. If
intervention in regional crises is the most likely mission for the future, (as it
has been in the past) how do naval forces best serve to stabilize a crisis?
Conversely, where and when might naval forces be expected to incur
unacceptable risks (meaning, in the broad context, risks to the national
interests, and not just to the naval units themselves) which therefore dictate
that alternatives to naval intervention be sought? In the "new world order"
these questions have pivotal significance for two reasons.
First, the most recent revision of the National Security Strategy of
the United States, designates "crisis response" as a strategic priority on a
level with conventional and nuclear deterrence? This has made possible a
refocussmg of the Navy's strategic planning from its traditional naval
missions of the Cold War --anti-submarine warfare and sea-launched strikes
against the navy and land -based targets of the Soviet Union --to forward
presence in the littoral regions of the world, and crisis response in regional
2The exceptions seem to be formal investigations into incidents which result
in a loss of life, damage to a vessel, or substantial adverse publicity.
Examples include the Department of Defense investigations. Formal
Investigation into the Downing of Iran Air Flight frSS by USS VINCENNES
(CG-49). and the Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut International
Airport Terrorist Act. (Long Commission Report).
3The National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1990). The draft version of the 1991 National
Security Strategy replaces "force projection" with "crisis response," in accord-
ance with the terminology spelled out in President Bush's Aspen Speech.

conflicts. This change in national priorities means that naval intervention in
regional conflicts (i.e. "gunboat diplomacy," to use the more traditional term)
will be the most likely mission for the future, and the central issue for future
naval strategy and force structure planning.
Secondly, the integration of naval presence and crisis intervention
into the security strategy of the United States needs to be reevaluated
because of other, significant changes in the world order, notably: (1) the
proliferation of technologically sophisticated weapons systems which enables
even relatively weak coastal nations to challenge the impunity of naval
vessels; and (2) the growing political sophistication and diversity of national
interests; among regional powers which means that a warship, or even a
naval task force, simply does not carry the same degree of political wTeight
(or is not accorded the same "respect") that it once was.
As a consequence, one of the most important issues for U.S. naval
strategy in the contemporary world is to define the political limits of naval
presence and crisis response, and determine how naval intervention—
"gunboat diplomacy"—should be used in the current geostrategic climate to
best support the national interests.
Failure to address these issues, or to adequately account for the
significant changes in the world "s political environment, would constitute the
classic strategic mistake—that is, preparing to fight the last war. The "last
war" in this case would not, however, be the one the U.S. Navy planned to
fight but never did—namely, a global war against the Soviet Union—but
rather, the ones the Navy actually did fight. : the series of Third World
conflicts and regional interventions to which the Navy responded during the
Cold War years. Without due regard for the changing U.S. relationship with
the Third World—and a serious critique of recent U. S. experiences in dealing

with Third World crises --the Navy's new strategy is no more certain to be
the correct one than if the nation continued to employ a Maritime Strategy
designed to counter a monolithic Soviet threat.
The past decade offers numerous examples of U. S. intervention in
regional instabilities and crises which achieved varying degrees of success.
Many of these provide important lessons for the future in how and when to
use naval forces, and what the risks are to the national interest if a given
mission fails to achieve its military or political objectives.
This study is an examination of United States naval strategy and its
evolving; focus on crisis intervention, and how recent uses of U.S. naval force
illustrate a need for a reevaluation of naval intervention and its
implementation in a "new world order." To this end, three specific uses of
U. S. naval power in the last decade are instructive—the U.S. intervention in
Lebanon in 1962, the 1966 air strike on Tripoli, Libya; and the Persian Gulf
tanker escort operation of 1967- IQ ft ft
.
It should be noted that the term "naval strategy" is used
throughout this study to mean the naval element of U.S. security strategy of
the U.S. Wavy. The term "Maritime Strategy" identifies the 1966 Maritime
Strategy issued by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and its
derivatives and later revisions. The distinction between naval and maritime
strategy has been clarified by Colin S. Gray and Roger YvT . Barnett:
"Maritime strategy refers to the purposeful exercise
of the sea-using national assets of all kinds for the political
goals set by government. Naval strategy refers more narrowly

to the purposeful exercise of naval forces, again for the political
goals set by government.'"4
II. DESIGNING A NEW NAVAL STRATEGY
Strategic Considerations for a New Era
"Y/hat we require now is a defense policy that
adapts to the significant changes we are witnessing — without
neglecting the enfuring realities that will continue to shape our
security strategy. A policy of peacetime engagement every bit
as constant and committed to the defense of our interests and
ideals in today's world as in the time of conflict and Cold War."
--President George Bush, 2 August 1991
In the last two years, the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy has
undergone a revolution which has dramatically reshaped its Cold War
orientation. Originally issued as the maritime component of the National
Military Strategy (NSDD-32 of 20 May 1962), the Maritime Strategy was
published in 1966 as an unclassified supplement to the Naval Institute
Proceedings. The specific intention of that document was to define the global
4Colin S. Gray and Roger W. Barnett, eds., Seapower and Strategy (Annapolis:
U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1969), 376.

use of naval forces from peacetime through global war to war terminations
It specifically identified the Soviet Union as the principal threat to world
peace and to U.S. national interests, and sought to lay out general principles
for die deterrence of Soviet aggression, and a strategy for war-fighting
should that deterrent capability prove insufficient.6
The original Maritime Strategy served three purposes. First, it
identified the nature of the principle threat to U. S. security and explained
how the U. S. Navy would be used to counter that threat. This provided
internal direction for the Navy's strategic planning and training effort in
order to successfully prepare for a global conventional or nuclear war.
Secondly, the Maritime Strategy established some method for determining
the size and composition of forces required to carry out that mission, and
ostensibly provided a justification to the Congress for the 600-ship fleet
proposed by Secretary of the Navy John Lehman. Third, it addressed in
general terms how the Navy would be used to prosecute a global war against
the only globally-capable adversary, the Soviet Union. Those principles of
deterrence and war-fighting are still considered valid in the unlikely event
that the U.S. is required to respond to a resurgent Soviet Union or some other
global threat to U.S. security.
-Admiral James D. Watkins, USN, "The Maritime Strategy," U. S. Naval
I nstitute Proceedings
.
(supplementary issue) (January 1966): 4. References
to the Maritime Strategy in this paper are to this document. For a summary
of the evolution of the Navy's Maritime Strategy see Captain Peter M.
Schwartz, USN "The Maritime Strategy in Review," in Naval Institute
Proceedings. (February 1967): 113; and John B. Hattendorf, "The Evolution
of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, 1977-1966," Naval War College Review
(Summer 1966): 7.
6Linton F. Brooks, "Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the
Maritime Strategy/' International Security 1 1 (Fall 1966): 61.

With the dramatic changes of the last several years, however, the
underlying assumptions of the Maritime Strategy no longer reflect the world
political realities for the broad spectrum of naval operations The
diminishing threat posed by the Soviet Union has greatly reduced the
likelihood of global war and, consequently, the requirement for the United
States to maintain the forces needed to respond immediately to a threat of
that magnitude. At the same time, however, the aggregate dangers to
national and world security have shown no indication of diminishing.
Numerous points of friction between nations, nationalities, ethnic sects, and
economies, coupled with the evaporation of the stabilizing influence of a
common adversary, have increased the likelihood of an imbalance in the
world's political equilibrium. Adding to tins imbalance is the proliferation
of technologically advanced weapons systems which enable even the
smallest nations (or politically-motivated organizations or terrorist groups)
to exert a disproportionate influence on regional balances of power, and to
threaten the security of stronger nations or the freedom of navigation on the
high seas.
In a world characterized more by uncertainty than anytiling else,
there has been great deal of effort emended to define the premises upon
which a reliable strategy could be based. One recent monograph cites twelve
specific studies over the last three years which have been devoted
exclusively to determining how the Navy should direct its predictably
declining resources to account for the changed geostrategic environment and
the future threat.7 One such effort by the Center for Strategic and
7 Scott C. Truver, Tomorrow's Fleet: a Question of Strategic Advantage Lost.
(Cherry Hill, NJ: Information Spectrum Inc., 1990), 1 1.

International Studies derives seven characteristics which are considered




A reduced risk of general nuclear war;
(2) A perception of die Soviets as more of a regional power (even
if possessing nuclear weapons);
(3) Increased diversity in the range of potential threats to U.S.
security;
(4) xAm increased influence of domestic politics on U. S. national
security decision-making, with fewer economic resources
available for national security;
(5) A projected decline in America's ability to shape the course of
international events, especially in the economic sphere;
(6) A more selective use and smaller -scale application of U. S. military
force in localized conflicts (driven, in part, by a reduced U. S.
intent to become involved overseas;
(7) An increasingly regional focus for all countries.3
As a result of such changes in the world political situation, the
Navy began nearly two years ago to conduct a reappraisal of the Maritime
Strategy. In a 30 December 1969 "White Paper" entitled "The Necessity for
Naval Power in the 1990s" the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Carlisle
Trost, laid out a number of principles central to the revaluation of the
nation's naval strategy:9
3Schlesinger, Jarnes R. and Douglas M. Johnston, Project Directors, An Intro-
uUClOry ..-uj.'jy 02 int? KOie OJ ivicuiuniv ruwgi m cm ulx'-.yi umi Ti'i'iiu
^ j
(Washington: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1990) iv.
9Admiral C. H. Trost, USN, "The Necessity for Naval Power in the 1990s," 30
December 1969. Open distribution copy of CNO (OP-OOK) Memorandum.
Quotations cited are from pages 3-6 of the 1 1-page document.

(i) Responding to crises is a traditional naval mission. Naval forces
A *m> '' ...——...- -. — . ...
enjoyed particular advantages which made them ideal for responding
to crisis situations. These include a "calculated ambiguity" which com-
plicates the defensive considerations of opposing parties, while not
committing the United States irrevocably to a particular course of
action; flexibility of action, diversity of capability, and immediacy of
resources, which serve to maximize the options available to policy-
makers; and political flexibility which enables them to be removed
from a location without the adverse political repercussions which
attend a retreat or re-stationing of land-based forces.
(2) The Soviet Union is preoccupied with internal reform and appears
genuinely committed to a peaceful and friendly relationship with the
United States. Underpinning the optimistic tone of this statement is,
however, the recognition that "the Soviet Union, because of her
geostrategic dominance of the Eurasian land mass and latent military
power, will remain a power with which to reckon."
(3) The most likely military situation is "low intensity conflict."
Rising populations, nationalist movements, religious zealotry and the
struggle for control of crucial resources fuel regional wars and
antagonisms. According to the 1966 National Security Strategy and
the 1969 Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term
Strategy 10
,
regional instabilities and conflicts involving fundamental
10Cited in the CNO White Paper, p. S.

American interests are the highest probability areas for U. S. military
involvement.
(4) Developing countries are armed with "First World" weapons which
"continue to add a most difficult and dangerous dimension to the
missions of peacekeeping and conflict containment."
(5) The Navy in existence is the minimum force necessary to maintain
U. S. commitments. This included the maintenance of regional stability
in critical areas of the world, effective participation in anti-narcotics
operations, and responding to day -in, day-out national requirements.
A reduction in forces could only be compensated by extending the
length of overseas deployments beyond the practical limit gauged to
permit retention of personnel and provide for upkeep of the fleet.
The fundamental defense issue, according to this document, was to
"maintain a military posture that presents a credible deterrent vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union while also protecting U. S. interests and those of allies from a
diversity of regional threats." 11 The strategic deterrent provided by
ballistic missile and attack submarines would remain a paramount function
of the Navy under any conditions. To neglect the threat posed by a nuclear-
capable adversary --of whatever nationality—would be to fall prey to the
"maximum likelihood fallacy:" concentrating attention on the most likely
11 Ibid, p. 6.

types of conflict while ignoring the most dangerous threats. 12 Such a
mistake would be strategically negligent.
Nevertheless, tlie significant change which this paper makes clear
is the shift in focus from the Soviet Union to regional instability and low-
intensity conflict as the most probable threat to national interests, and the
most likely arena for naval operations in the future.
The 1990 National Security Strategy
Such a shift in strategic focus was officially addressed in the 1990
National Security Strategy, and was reflected in a revision to the Maritime
Strategy issued two months later. The National Security Strategy established
four principle missions for the military:
(1) Deterrence: persuading potential adversaries that the costs of
aggression, either nuclear or conventional, would exceed any conceive
-
able gain.O
(2) Strong Alliances: collective defense arrangements which allow
for the combination of economic and military strengths thus lessening
the burden on any one country.
12Ronald W. Jenkins, Coalition Defense versus Maritime Strategy: A Critical
Examination Illustrating a New Approach to Geopolitical Analysis. (Philadel-
phia: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965), 103. See also Geoffrev
Till, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age. (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1964), 214.

(3) Forward Defense : defense of shared values and common inter-
ests requires the forward presence of significant American military
forces to provide the capability for early, direct defense against ag-
gression and serve as a visible reminder of U.S. commitment to the
common effort.
(4) Force Projection: global security interests dictate the mainte-
nance of ready forces and the means to move them to reinforce units
forward deployed or to project power into areas where the U.S. has no
permanent presence . * 3
The first three of these missions, deterrence, coalitions with allies,
and forward defense formed the three pillars of both the National Security
Strategy and the Maritime Strategy from the earlier Cold War era.
According to the 1966 Maritime Strategy, operations of a lesser intensity
than global war, such as routine peacetime operations and crisis
management, were considered essential elements of stability maintenance,
but were not the major objectives of the strategy.
"Preparation for global war is the critical element in
ensuring deterrence, but our peacetime operations and response
in time of crisis are also crucial contributions to deterrence and
stability. Therefore, while die peacetime presence and crisis
response components of our Maritime Strategy are less detailed
and formal than the warfighting component, they are no less
important. In fact the volatility of today's international
situation suggests that we must expect to employ these
^The National Security Strategy of the United States, 2 v

elements or our Maritime Strategy in an expanding set of the
world's trouble spots." 14
Tne 1990 update to tne Maritime strategy recognized, however,
that low-intensity conflict posed a separate and distinct danger to national
security which required a "broadening of the national strategic focus." 1 -'
The catalyst for this redirection of strategic thinking was the proliferation of
technologically advanced weapons which have served to provide virtually
every nation in the world with the capability to effect regional politics, and
to threaten the freedom of the seas of even major world maritime powers.
By the end of the 1960s, the export and sale of Western defense technologies
had created a threat to regional security which was unrelated to East- West-
competition, and not subject to superpower influence. As Admiral Trost
noted:
"With or without superpower involvement, low-
intensity conflicts will be increasinelv violent and involve high
technology. The proliferation of sophisticated weapons
worldwide means that the types of naval forces designed to
prevail in the most technically sophisticated and modern threat
environment, exemplified by Soviet capabilities, are
increasingly the same types of naval forces required to fight.
Hwatkins "Th^ Msni-im^ Stra t^ov " r Elsewhere Admiral Watkins
acknowledges that "seapower is relevant across the spectrum of conflict,
from routine operations in peacetime to the provision of the most survivable
component of our forces for deterring strategic nuclear war." (p. 7.)
Notwithstanding this acknowledgement of the broader applicability of the
Maritime Strategy, the Navy, as Linton Brooks noted, "devoted most of its
attention to those aspects of the strategy dealing with global conventional
war." (Brooks, p. 64).
^Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost, "Maritime Strategy for the 1990s," U. S. Naval
Institute Proceedings (May 1990): 92.

anyone else. The main difference is in the number of ships and
aircraft, that must be brought to bear, rattier than their
individual combat, capability . *' * 6
The basic assumption of the Maritime Strategy—that preparation for global
war against the Soviet Union inherently prepared U. S. forces for any lesser
conflict—amounted to a denial of any special war-fighting requirements for
regional conflicts, and overlooked the historical record of U.S. overseas
involvement. The specific focus of strategic planning was centered on the
upper end of the spectrum of conflict—at global conventional and nuclear
war—where the level of violence was most intense, but where the
probability of occurrence was lowest.
The utility of naval forces for dealing with any particular point
along the spectrum of conflict, from presence and crisis response to global
conventional war, lay in their inherent mobility, rapid response, calculated
ambiguity of purpose, and their demonstration of superior firepower and
national commitment. 17 Those qualities have not been altered with changes
in the geostrategic climate, and remain valid today.
In contrast to the eariier Cold War focus, however, the newer
strategy emphasizes preparation for regional conflict independent of its
relation to global war. Two characteristics of this change in strategic focus
are significant. First, the shift in planning focus from the extreme end of the
spectrum to the more volatile center recognizes the decline in East-West
tensions, the frequent need to protect U. S. interests from threats below the
16 Ibid., 94.
17R. James Woolsey, "Planning a Navy: The Risks of Conventional Wisdom,"
in Steven E. Miller and Stephen Van Evera, eds„ Naval Strategy and National
Security, (Princeton. Princeton University Press, 1988), 9.

threshold of general conventional war., and the fact that movement toward
the right side of the spectrum has never progressed beyond regional
confrontation. This last point reconciles a problem Which the original
Maritime Strategy never satisfactorily addressed --that there could be a
conflict involving the Soviet Union at the sub -strategic or regional level
which might not escalate to global war.18
Secondly, the expanded attention at levels below general war—the
domain of various degrees of low-intensity conflict—accords with the
historical facts of life since the end of the Second World War. While the
Navy's planning, training and preparations during the Cold War centered on
deterrence and execution of global war, the Wavy was actually responding to
numerous regional conflicts worldwide. 19 The revised "Operational
Continuum" therefore represents the reality of political uses of naval force
since 1946, and not simply a heirarchy of the modes of conflict. In essence,
this represents a truer picture of the world as it is than the earlier model,
which was based on speculation and the perceived intent of the Soviet Union.
There is a second way in which this evolving strategy more
accurately reflects reality. The principle rationale underlying the Maritime
Strategy was its focus on countering the Soviet threat to U. S. interests, and
more specifically to guaranteeing the security of the European NATO nations.
As such, it has been argued, it was no maritime strategy at all, but rather the
naval component of a continental strategy "designed to support campaigns in
ground theaters of operations both directly and indirectly."20 Within that
lsBrooks, Naval Power and National Security . 7^.
19See note 1.
^'-'Watkiris, "The Maritime Strategy/ 4; cited in Strategy and a Future Navy,
(page 12) a paper delivered by William S. Lmd, President, of the Military

continental strategy, force projection was the means to implement the
strategic element of "horizontal escalation" against secondary targets of the
Soviet Union in order to divide its battle front during a Central European
war.21
Owing to its European focus, the Maritime Strategy paid little
attention to the necessity for military intervention, or even of significant
national interests, outside the context of East-West competition. Conflicts in
the Third World transcended the interests of states directly involved only
insofar as they served as back-drop for more potentially serious conflicts
between major powers. Thus a "fundamental component of the nations
success in deterring war with the Soviet Union depends upon our ability to
stabilize and control escalation in Third World crises."22 But there was little
intrinsic strategic value attributed to U.S. intervention in regional issues
outside of the U.S.-Soviet context.
In contrast, the 1QQ0 update to the Maritime Strategy differenti-
ated more clearly between the wartime and peacetime uses of naval power:
Reform Caucus, before the U. S. Naval Institute Conference on "Future U. S.
Naval Power/' San Diego, July 1986-
21The debate about this element of the Maritime Strategy was characterized
early on by two articles appearing in Foreign Affairs : Robert W. Komer,
"Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition Defense" 60 (Summer 1962) 1125; and
Stansfield Turner and George Thibault, "Preparing for the Unexpected: The
Need for a New Military Strategy" 61 (Fall 1Q62) 122. Other sources include
John J. Mearsheirner, "A Strategic Misstep" in Miller and Van Evera, and
Francis
J.
West, "The Maritime Strategy: The Next Step," Naval Institute
Press. January 196" 7, 40.
22Watldns, "The Maritime Strateo-v," S.

"The objectives of the peacetime posture of the U. S.
Navy and Marine Corps are to achieve deterrence, meet alliance
and treaty commitments, support national diplomatic objectives,
and to be ready for the rapid response essential to deal with
any crisis."2^
Achieving these objectives provided "regional stability while preserving U. S.
economic and foreign policy interests."24 As opposed to the original version,
wherein "the more stable the international environment the lower the
probability that the Soviets will risk war with the West, "25 this revision
acknowledged that the preservation of international stability had intrinsic
value for U. S. interests, independent of military and political competition
between the United States and Soviet. Union. Maintenance of stability
required the ongoing commitment of the United States, which could be best
demonstrated by the worldwide presence of U. S. naval forces.
While the 1966 Maritime Strategy provided a predominantly
combat-oriented strategy for the protection of the European front and the
defeat of a global adversary, the later revision to that strategy addressed the
peaceful preservation of stability in the numerous unidentifiable arenas of
U.S. strategic interest. Together, the Maritime Strategy and its later revision
provided a naval strategy which more realistically addressed the full
spectrum of naval operations from peace to global war.
S'Trost, "Maritime Strategy for the 1990s," 94.
*/Nd, p. 96.
-Watkms, "The Maritime Strategy," 6.

The Aspen Speech and the New National Security Strategy
The final and most dramatic change to the U.S. naval strategy is the
result of an address given by President Bush at the fortieth anniversary of
the Aspen Institute in Aspen, Colorado26 . Occurring on the very day that
Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait, this address was virtually overlooked by the
press corps and received only minimal attention. Nevertheless, the
principles laid out by the President provided a new direction for the nation's
security strategy which would further direct the evolution of U.S. naval
strategy toward a primary mission of naval intervention.
The President's remarks wTere based on several assumptions. First,
the threat to U. S. and European security posed by the Soviet Union
continued to wane, and the possibility of global or nuclear war was at a
lower level than at any time in the previous forty years. As a consequence,
the future threat, to U. S. security would not corne from a global power like
the Soviet Union, but from an indeterminate number of militarily
sophisticated regional powers which could upset the stability of international
peace, commerce, and political and social development. Lastly, alliances
would remain as essential to collective security and diplomatic relations as
they had been during the Cold War. Nevertheless, the growing divergence
of national interests would make alliances less certain than they had been
in the past.
From these assumptions, it was clear that the strategic posture of
the United States would be determined by a number of considerations:
26George Bush, "Remarks to the Aspen Symposium," Aspen, Colorado.

(1) Enduring Soviet military capabilities would require that the
United States continue to modernize its strategic deterrent triad of
land-based and sea-based ICBMs and long-range bombers, and
continue development of the Strategic Defense Initiative.
(2) Overall., however, U. S. military forces would become smaller in
proportion to the reduced threat to U. S. and Allied security. A 2j%
reduction across the board was considered realistic.
(3) Forward presence of U. S. forces would continue to be a key
element, of the nation's defensive posture, and a visible display of U. S.
engagement in international security problems.
(4) A military force capable of power projection to remote locations
overseas would be required for the defense of U. S. interests and for
responding to regional crises.
(5) Preservation of the nation's industrial base would be essential for
reconstitution of armed forces if a global threat re-emerged, and to
provide for continued, phased acquisition of technologically superior
defense svsterns.27
27Following the President's speech in Aspen, this shift in defense policy
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-Remarks by General Colin L. Powell, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, at the National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Baltimore,
Maryland, 2.3 August 1990; and at the 72nd Annual National Convention of
the American Legion, Indianapolis, Indiana, 30 August. 1990;
-Remarks delivered by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, at the
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Hot Springs, Virginia, 6
September 1990;
- Speech by LtGen Butler, Director of the Strategic Planning Division of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the National Press Club, Washington, D. C, 27
September 1990. (Sources cited are from DOD -circulated copies of these
addresses.)

Like the assumptions of the CSIS study cited earlier (note 12),
these observations represented a best estimate of the future security
environment of the United States. Unlike the CSIS study., however, the
President's statements were more than observations about the changing
world. Rather, they directed a radical reshaping of the nation's security
strategy, based on four foundations: deterrence, forward presence, crisis
response, and force recoristitution.
This divergence from the earlier Maritime Strategy has immediate
implications for naval operations and for the acquisition and design of naval
forces, as well, centering on the development of capabilities for the
projection of force in Third World and regional conflicts. Such a shift in focus
was already fundamental to the CNO White Paper, with its reference to crisis
response as a "traditional naval mission;" the concern expressed about the
enhanced capabilities of Third World weapons systems (including the threats
posed by mines and diesel submarines); and the power -projection
capabilities inherent in carrier-based aviation. Marine Corps amphibious
assault teams and the Combat Logistics Force. The significance of the Aspen
Speech is that it established a new direction for strategic planning.
There is, however, another issue raised by the security structure
proposed in the President's address—that of a substantial cut in defense
spending. A determining factor in the evolution of the nation's future
defenses is the anticipated reduction in the budget. Under the plan proposed
by President Bush—and subsequently adopted by the Seoretarv of Defense
the Chairman of the joint Chiefs, and the Chief of Naval Operations—there
will be a reduction in military force structure of 2 S3 across the board,
targetted for implementation in 1995 Current projections estimate a

reduction in the size of the Navy from 536 vessels to 45 0.28 The implications
of such a decrease for naval operations and fleet size for the future are
substantial.
For the modern Navy., the responsibility to respond to changes in
global politics, a redefined national strategy, and a restrictive budget fat-
transcends the routine difficulties experienced in managing a Navy of—as
the saying goes --"thirty-year ships built under a five-year plan by the
direction of a two-year Congress with the assistance of three-year officers
using a one-year budget." The extra-ordinary expense associated with fleet
construction, and the increasing complexity of warships (and the extensive
training required for their crews) makes rapid response to a change in
strategy or economics difficult to accommodate. Moreover, the frequency
with which the Navy has been called upon to protect the nation's interests
during the last forty -five years, cautions against, a radical or unstudied
reduction of forces.
This has been demonstrated no more clearly than during the last
decade when the Navy was involved in S2 specific instances of maritime
interdiction, shows of force, political demonstration, or humanitarian
assistance, only one of which involved direct confrontation with forces of the
Soviet. Union 29 According to the Chief of Naval Operations, the Navy's
28Michael Gordon, "Pentagon Drafts New Battle Plan," New York Times, 2
August. 1990, Al.
—Based on the Adam B. Siegel inventory (note l),there were 47 instances
during the 1950s (up to a closure date of 1 August 1969) which involved U.
S. Naval forces. John F. Morton, "The U. S. Navy in 1969," U. S. Naval Institute
Proceedings. (May 1990): 166, adds five additional instances during the
remainder of the year. The single "confrontation" involving naval forces of
the United States and those of the Soviet Union was the September 196.3
search for the missing airliner KAL 007.

operating tempo was 20% higher in 1966 than it had been during the
Vietnam War, even though the U. S. was involved in no formal conflict."30
Based on such a projected tempo of operations, it is easy to see that
a substantial reduction in the size of the Navy must inevitably force
theUnited States to reduce its overseas commitments and choose between
competing requirements—even if the Soviet Union unilaterally withdraws
from the competition for naval supremacy and leaves the United States as
the only naval superpower. It is not conceivable that a Navy of 400-450
ships will be able to support the operating tempo of the 1960s when the
fleet averaged 560 vessels.
The challenge for the Navy lies in devising a strategy which does
more than simply appease the grail quest for a "peace dividend". The real
need is to review the entire range of naval forces, preserve and enhance the
essential mission capabilities, and eliminate or reprioritize those which do
not contribute directly to the security of U. S. vital interests. As the
President noted in the Aspen Speech,
"The United States would be ill-served by forces that
represent nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down
version of the ones we possess at present. If we simply pro-
rate our reductions --cut equally across the board—we could
easily end up with more than we need for contingencies that
are no longer likely—and less than we must have to meet
3° Trost, "The Maritime Strategy," op at, page 5- Competing against the 52
operational missions ciieo aDOve nave Deen me routine cycie oi manuateu
inspections, essential maintenance and overhaul periods, and annual U. S.
and Allied training exercises (over 300 in fiscal year 1969), which have
grown more intense in recent years despite the frequent operational
taskings.

emerging challenges. What we need are not merely reductions,
but restructuring . "31
Even relatively minor "restructuring," however, promises to have
far -reaching consequences for some long-established naval priorities,
particularly in acquisition.-'2 As might be expected, there has been a certain
amount of institutional paranoia at the prospect that the Navy, like the other
services, will have to "build down" to accommodate the reevaluation of U. S.
security strategy. As Norman Friedman observed, "to adopt an explicit
strategy implies a process of choice; such choice creates winners—and losers
—in a bureaucracy, both in kinds of forces supported and in kinds of
technology purchased . "33
Nevertheless, the revaluation of naval strategy is not "merely" an
issue of responding to the changes in the world's political alignments. It is a
necessity brought on by an identifiable reduction in the force structure,
which is likely to preclude the same type of vigorous naval presence that
characterized U.S. naval operations in the 1960s. This is merely one more—
though perhaps the most immovable—reason why the U.S. maritime strategy
is undergoing a revolution. The important issue is to identify the
foundations for a naval strategy which can meet the nation's needs in a "new
31The Aspen Speech, p. 2.
32For example, the emphasis which the 1990 National Security Strategy
places on conventional deterrence, forward presence, and force projection
capabilities is viewed by many as justifying the need for some forces (V-22
Osprev, DDG-Sl, and A- 12 replacement) while undermining the relative
importance of other newT weapon systems (SSN-2 1 and the P-7 aircraft)
which had earlier been critical to the top-level naval priorities of strategic
deterrence and anti-submarine warfare.
33Norrnan Friedman, The U.S. Maritime Strategy (London: Jane's Publishing
Co., Ltd. 1966) 14.

world order," and avoid, to the greatest degree possible, having the strategy
imposed by budget restrictions.
A Naval Strategy for the 2 1st Century
From the geopolitical changes of the last several years and the
foundation established by President Bush at Aspen, Colorado, a new naval
strategy is emerging which looks beyond the Cold War orientation of the past
forty -five years. This new strategy is shaped by the three principal
influences which are defining the current state of U.S. security strategy: (1)
the reduced likelihood of conflict between the United States and Soviet
Union; (2) the increasing necessity to maintain world stability and protect
U.S. interests from regional threats; and (3) the certain decline in force
structure and operations due to budgetary limitations and competing
domestic priorities. In recent testimony before Congress-^, Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral Frank B. Kelso, described a new naval strategy
comprised of the following elements:
• Preservation of the SSBN and SSN force as the most secure leg of the
nation's strategic triad.
• Continued emphasis on forward presence to reassure allies, deter
aggression, and provide a base for rapid crisis response.
-^Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, 2 1 February
1991. From a transcript released by the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations and House Armed Services Committee.

• An orientation toward maintaining global stability, and responding
to regional crises, rather than containing Soviet expansion.
• Maritime superiority to ensure unrestricted access for trade, and to
provide a means to project power and control use of the sealanes.
• Reconstitution of a larger fleet as a basis for deterrins" or combating
a global adversary. For the Navy this capability is predicated on an
active industrial base and research and development effort.
• Continued reliance on coalitions and alliances to expand the power
available and share responsibilities for military operations.
• An emphasis on naval operations as one element in broader joint
military campaigns with the U.S. Army and Air Force.
• The acknowledgement that power projection ashore, supported by
sea control in any naval operating area (particularly in littoral waters)
will be a priority for future naval operations 35
The "bottom line" requirement to support these missions in the
current strategic climate is a fleet of 450 ships. Even so, the smaller force
would have a predictable effect on the Navy's ability to operate in the
accustomed patterns. Future operations would require substantial variation
in the size of aircraft carrier battlegrou.ps and Marine Amphibious Ready
Groups, depending upon their assigned missions, region of deployment, and
the potential threat. Forces would be required to surge from one theater of
operations to another if a crisis arose. And there would be an increased
need to develop and deploy advanced weapons systems (Aegis air defense.
35 in contrast to the earlier Maritime Stratesfv, sea control is now considered
a prerequisite for power projection and other naval operations, and not a
strategic objective of itself. See discussion in Till, p. 1Q2.

TOMAHAWK cruise missiles, improved ASW sensors) in order to provide an
indigenous strike and self-protection capability for naval forces which would
deploy in fewer numbers.
Notwithstanding such tactical accommodations, there would be
identifiable risks associated with such a smaller Navy. First is the obvious
limitation on the Navy's ability to adequately cover all the missions which
have been required of it in the recent past. Eliminating the least essential of
those requirements would reduce U.S. participation in annual allied and
combined-navy exercises, and probably limit overseas naval presence in
areas which had been routinely visited (such as the Indian Ocean, which is
nowT projected to receive a deploying carrier battlegroup only six months out
of the year). Furthermore, the response time to emerging crises would
lengthen as naval task forces were surged from other theaters of operation,
or while they made long transits from other areas. Further restrictions
would exist on the Navy's ability to respond to simultaneous crises, such as
the recent emergency evacuations of U.S. and foreign civilians from both
Monrovia, Liberia, and Mogadishu, Somalia, during the build-up for
Operation DESERT SHIELD.
The significance of the CNO's testimony, and of the manner in
which the new naval strategy is presented, is that it does not focus on
requirements to sustain deterrence and war -fighting capabilities against the
Soviet Union (save those associated with strategic nuclear deterrence and
reconstitution).'56 In contrast to the Maritime Strategy, all of the war-
frAdmiral Kelso emphasized frequently that U.S. military forces should be
gauged according to Soviet capabilities, and not their professed intentions.
There is a growing body of evidence, however, that the Soviets may lack the
military capabilities to pose a global threat, whatever their intentions. A

lighting requirements and all of the anticipated shortfalls resulting from the
smaller force are explained in terms of how they effect traditional forward
presence, power projection, and crisis response capabilities.
It is this redirection away from the Soviet threat—of the nation's
need principally to keep a watchful eye on developments in Eastern Europe,
on Soviet naval production rates, on their compliance with forthcoming arms
control initiatives, and on their diplomatic efforts in the Third World and
elsewhere—which gives the best indication of how far the current naval
strategy has traversed from its earlier Cold War focus.
Faced with the prospect of being the world's only true "maritime
superpower, "?? the United States is now in a position similar to that of Great
Britain at the turn of the century. What is not the same is the sort of world
which the new geopolitical climate is nurturing: one which more and more
recognizes autonomy as an inherent right of states, as—due largely to the
efforts of the United States --nations are more and more finding it necessary
to recognize democratic autonomy as an inherent right of their people, both
as individuals and as citizens.
Protecting the national interests while maintaining world and
regional stability in a "new world order" based on such principles is likely to
prove a mission for the Navy which is every bit as demanding operationally
recent example is a revealing series of articles in 72te fK^stijjjgtejj Post
(November 16-21) detailing the social, ethnic and disciplinary problems
which have plagued the Soviet. Army and Navy for years, and which are now
so pervasive that the Soviet military services seem on the verge of paralysis.
'-'7The CNO cited a remark of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Colin
Powell, that "The 'superpower shingle' hangs outside the door of only nation."

--and far more challenging politically—than preparing for global war against
a well-defined and equivalently-armed adversary.
III. CRISIS RESPONSE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER
The Resurrection of Gunboat Diplomacy
"Maritime forces will assume an ever increasing role
as we reduce our land-based forces under a CFE agreement.
The need for modern, multi-role naval units will not diminish.
Surface combatants are critical to providing carrier battle group
flexibility and power projection capability. The ability to
introduce U.S. power at a time and place of our choosing
requires us to continue to maintain a robust amphibious war-
fare capability, sized to carry all levels of amphibious forces."
--General John Galvin, USA,
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe^8
This prediction illustrates a strategic paradox of the age we are
entering: the mission for the nation's naval forces will increase at the same
time that the threat of global war is diminishing. Indeed, as the U.S. and
Soviet Union progress toward stabilizing arms control agreements, and
ground-based military forces are redeployed within national boundaries,
'^Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 7 March 1991.

there will be a greater need for naval forces in order to preserve the
capability to project U.S. power "at a time and place of our choosing."
Ott« of the central problems of the evolving naval strategy will be
the difficulty in defining some cohesive rationale against which to measure
its success. By its nature, a strategy directed toward crisis response will
most likely be gauged by the aggregate success of any number of unrelated
incidents. This could prove to be a singular disadvantage when compared to
the Maritime Strategy of the Cold War. During that period, every military
venture was measured against a calculus of benefits and ills befalling the
two principal chess players, the United States and the Soviet Union. Even a
setback in U.S. policy as a result of a failed or partially successful use of
military force could be mitigated somewhat by demonstrating that there had
accrued no clearcut advantage for the Communist world either. In addition,
great powers, as James Cable pointed out, can afford to absorb occasional
losses and political humiliations which would be intolerable to the status and
power of lesser nations.
^
9
However, in the "new world order" that may not be so clearly the
case. Lacking the broader perspective and dampening effect provided by
the "zero sum game" of East-West competition, U.S. foreign policy—
particularly that which involves the use of military force—will be subjected
to scrutiny at every step, with particular incidents gauged according to their
intrinsic value to U.S. interests. The immediate effect of this sort of scrutiny
will be to increase greatly the care administrations take in determining U.S.
interests prior to commiting military forces to action. In this regard, a series
of failures in the use of U.S. force, or even a perception of such a failure,
blames Cable, Diplomacy at Sea . (London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 196*5)52

could prove to be a crippling setback for an administration's foreign policy.
But the broader effect could be to bring public discredit on any particular
service which demonstrates an inability to achieve clearcut military
victories, or which incurs repeated damage to itself and thus tarnishes the
nation s image.
At a minimum, a consistent record of failure or of inadequate per-
formance will tear down service morale and cohesiveness. At the worst, it
can undercut a service's public image to the degree that its value to the
nation is questioned. This was recognized by Samuel P. Huntington in an
article written in 1954, as a danger peculiar to the naval services 40
Huntington argued that a nation's military services are comprised
of three fundamental elements: a strategic concept—a description of how,
when, and where the military service expects to protect the nation against
some threat to its security; the human and material resources which are
required by the service to implement its strategic concept, and are allocated
to it by society; and lastly, an organizational structure by which the service
manages its resources and implements its strategic concept effectively. If
the service is unable to adequately articulate its strategy, or fails to properly
and efficiently implement it, the society and its leadership will be unclear as
to the role of the service, and uncertain as to the necessitv of its existence.
This will translate into apathy or hostility toward the claims made by the
service upon the resources of the society:
"To secure these resources it is necessary for society
iorego uit? aiwrnauve ust-s w wni^n uiese resources un^m, dv
40Samuel P. Huntington, "National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy," U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings. 60 (May 1954): 463-

put and to acquiesce in their allocation to the military service.
This, the resources which a service is able to obtain in a
democratic society are a function of the public support of that
service. The service has the responsibility to develop this
necessary support, and it can only do this if it possesses a
strategic concept which clearly formulates its relationship to the
national security 4 *
Not only must the military services be adept at articulating a
realistic mission for themselves, they must be perceived as being able to
successfully carry it out. The net effect for a military which is unclear about
its own strategy, or ineffective in implementing it, is that its nation will stop
paying its bills. This has never been more true than it is for the present
circumstances.
Executing a national strategy founded on peacetime presence and
crisis response will require that the Navy and Marine Corps continue their
traditional missions as the U.S. military forces responsible for maintaining
diplomatic representation overseas, and for responding initially to crises
which endanger U.S. interests. But, even in regions where relations between
the U.S. and foreign nations are good, U.S. deployed forces make a lucrative
target for terrorist strikes by disaffected factions who oppose their own
national governments, or who desire to demonstrate the vulnerability of U.S.
military forces. Much of the political value in warship deployments is
gained through the display of military technology and capability, but as
many critics have noted, even heavily-armed warships are vulnerable to
41 Ibid, 46.3-

attack by hand-held weapons like RPGs or terrorist bombs when in ambig-
uous situations in enclosed waters, or when they are anchored or in port.42
The opportunity for U.S. Navy warships to find themselves in
dangerous situations is likely to increase in the future. The impending cuts
in the Federal budget and in defense expenditures, as well as manpower cuts
resulting from arms control initiatives and from less favorable political
support in many regions, will result in a scaling-back of U.S. foreign bases
and ground -force deployments. The responsibility for U.S. military repre-
sentation overseas will thus fall increasingly on the Wavy and Marine Corps.
In times of crisis, naval forces, which are traditionally the first to
arrive in a region of conflict (frequently even before the United States has
decided to adopt a particular course of action) and the last to leave, will be
exposed to the ambiguities of the opening phases of a crisis, and to the
repercussion of any action which the U.S. government may take
Furthermore, the operational doctrines currently being touted by both the
U.S. Air Force and the Army as a result of the experiences of Operation
DESERT SHIELD, call for future military operations to be built around the
rapid deployment of U.S. strike forces. Under such scenarios, the Army's
62nd Airborne Division or the Air Forces "s long-range conventional bomber
forces or tactical air squadrons—supported by in-flight refuelling services—
would be sortied from U.S. bases to conduct retributive or compellent strikes
against military targets which threatened regional stability or U.S. interests.
This strategy is evolving rapidly under a proposed Unified Command Plan of
the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and would establish a Contingency Force
42Norman Friedman, "The Rules of Engagement Issue," in Gueritz, et al, 35.

with principal responsibility for conducting this sort of mission in time of
crisis 43
The adoption at this sort of strike -fore* concept for future crisis
response would allow U.S. ground -based forces to venture forth from the
safe haven of bases within the continental U.S. or m secure foreign locations,
conduct their missions, and return, thus minimizing their exposure to
defensive or terrorist forces, or to long-term retaliation during extended
deployment, to a theater of operations. Meanwhile, U.S. naval forces would
continue to execute their missions in a more traditional fashion, establishing
a visible presence in a troubled region from the inception of a crisis to well
after its conclusion, maintaining open sealanes and skies, and generally
standing at risk as the situation clarifies. While conducting routine stability
operations, and certainly when reacting to a crisis, naval forces would be
highly susceptible to both low-technology terrorist-type weapons and to the
sophisticated military hardware which continues to be available on the open
market.
Given these realities, it is essential that the utility and limits of
naval presence and intervention be reassessed. A valuable starting point for
understanding the employment of modern naval forces in low intensity
conflict is the definition of "gunboat diplomacy" originated by James Cable:
"Gunboat diplomacy is the use or threat of limited
naval force, otherwise than as -an act of war, in order to secure
advantage, or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an
4
^See Michael Gordon, "Pentagon Drafts New Battle Plan," New York Times. 2
August 1990, Al, and Eliot Cohen, "The Pentagon 2010," The New Republic,
15 March 1991.

international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the
territory or the jurisdiction of their own state."44
This definition emphasizes the limited application of force up to,
but not including, naval operations in time of war. This conforms precisely
to the current definition of low-intensity conflict which spans military
operations "at a level below conventional war but above routine peaceful
competition among states."4 -'
The distinguishing characteristic of gunboat diplomacy, aside from
the employment of warships, is its reliance on coercion. Cable emphasizes
that coercion is implicit in virtually every aspect of international relations
between benign diplomatic intercourse and the outright declaration of war.
Nevertheless, coercive diplomacy differs from the routine transactions of
statesmanship in its "resort to direct threats or even overt acts."46 Gunboat
diplomacy is a subspecies of coercive diplomacy distinguished by its use of
naval forces to establish the relationship. This is obvious from comparing
Cable's definition of the former with that of the latter:
44James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy : 191 9-1979, (London: Macmillan Press
Ltd., 1951X39.
45"Low-intensity conflict, is political-military confrontation between conten-
ding states or groups at a level below conventional war but above routine
peaceful competition among states. It involves protracted struggles of
competing principles and ideologies, and its manifestations range from
subversion to the use of armed forces. It is waged by a variety of political,
economic, international, and military instruments. These conflicts are often
in the Third World, but can contain regional and global security
implications." cited from Joint Pub 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary
of Military and Associated Terms, (formerly TCS Pub 1).
46James Cable. Diplomacy at Sea (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press,
1965X4.

"Coercive diplomacy is a resort to specific threats or to
injurious actions, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to
secure advantage, or to avert loss, in the furtherance of an
international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the
territory or the jurisdiction of their own state.'47
In Cable's scheme, gunboat diplomacy is coercive by definition. It
is manifest in four forms each of which has specific characteristics.
d&finiti¥&l the objective of which is to create a fait accsmpJi requiring that
an opposing state either acquiesce to an established condition or escalate to
conflict; purpossfuJ, by which such a level of damage is threatened or
inflicted that a State would be compelled to comply; xsteJrtJz in which a
State is forced to adopt a desired course of action through the apparent
consequences of some other indirect but related action; and &2spr&ssiv&, by
which a State acts to posture or demonstrate intent, or simply to provide a
vent for popular sentiment 48
To be valid, coercive diplomacy must be more than a general threat
to impose some disastrous penalty; it must imply some specific, immediate
consequence for the target nation which is related to an immediate action or
a particular dispute. Such broad claims as threatening nuclear (or
conventional) annihilation are senseless because, as Cable points out, they
are "the modern equivalent of threatening one's adversaries with the wrath
of God."49 There is even some empirical evidence that the threat of
47Cable. Diplomacy at Sea. 16.
48 Ibid.
49
1 bid,, 16. Cable cites the Cuban Missile Crisis as the only example where
"one government demonstrated belief in another's threat of nuclear war by a
significant change in policy." Nevertheless, U.S. nuclear superiority provided





annihilation, either stated or implied, has virtually no effect on diplomatic
bargaining or coercion, but is viewed merely as an extreme form of
posturing. In their study on the uses of military force, Blechman and Kaplan
concluded that, even between the United States and the Soviet Union, the
consequences of nuclear destruction were so out of balance with virtually
any desired condition of diplomatic bargaining,
"that our data do not support a hypothesis that the
strategic weapons balance between the United States and the
USSR influences outcomes. No support was found for the thesis
that positive outcomes would occur more often when the United
States had the advantage over the Soviet Union in ratios of
delivery vehicles and numbers of warheads. "50
Political Constraints on Gunboat Diplomacy
Numerous writers have maintained that gunboat diplomacy in
any form is fading from the world scene. These include Hedley Bull ("the
period we are now entering will be one in which opportunities for the
diplomatic use of naval forces, at least for the great powers, will be severely
circumscribed,"-' 1 ); and Kenneth Booth, who Cable cites as stating that "there
is no prospect of a revival of the sort of gunboat diplomacy which
5'JBarry M. Blechman, and Stephen S. Kaplan. Force Without War: U. S.




characterized the age of imperialism in the last century."52 Cable, himself,
states that the mere existence of gunboat diplomacy is controversial .53
Bull, for example, considered the effective use of naval forces in
support of national interests to broadly include supporting friends and
clients, coercing enemies, neutralizing activities by other naval powers,
exerting influence in politically ambiguous situations, or simply advertising a
nation's seapower by 'showing the flag.' Nevertheless, he believed that
"gunboat diplomacy
"
"is not a good term for these uses of sea power, taken
as a whole, because of its associations with one particular form
of naval diplomacy—the coercion of weak states by strong ones
for purposes such as the protection of their nationals or
property—a form that has long been in decline."-"*
The frequent use of U.S. naval forces in the last decade argues
against the claim that, such activities are in decline. Furthermore, it is
difficult to understand how "the coercion of weak states by strong ones"
necessarily prejudices the definition for some applications of naval power,
since it is a relatively rare event that the navy of a weaker state successfully
coerces a stronger one .55 Nevertheless, Bull's contention illustrates the
52Ken Booth, Law, Force and Diplomacy at Sea, (London: George Allen and
Unwin 1965), cited in James Cable, "Gunboat Diplomacy's Future", U.S. Naval
I nstitute Proceedings (August 1966): 36.
53cable, Gunboat diplomacy. 175.
54Hedley Bull, "Sea Power and Political Influence," in Jonathan Alford, ed„
Sea Power and Influence: Old Issues and New Challenges, (Osmun: Gower
and Allanheld, I960)
55Robert Mandel ("The Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy," International
Studies Quarterly 30 (Mar 66) 59) concludes that there is no necessary
correlation between the power of the assailant nation over the victim, &sv&pt.

widely held view that "gunboat diplomacy" is an unacceptable term for
modern international relations.
As Cable states, the nature of the international environment and its
influence on coercive diplomacy is "a subject too vast and complex for brief
discussion. "56 There are, however, several relevant observations to be made
about the role and influence of the international community on U.S.
perceptions of coercive diplomacy. First, the international community does
have at its disposal several active resources for controlling coercive
diplomacy among nations. Among them are military action, economic
sanctions or trade restrictions, adverse diplomatic measures, such as censure
by the United Nations, or simply loss of international political support or
national prestige .-j7
In the case of the United States, however, its military power,
economic strength, political vitality and customary (though varying)
attention to coalition building, has meant that these restraints have rarely,
if ever, been brought to bear against the United States. Thus, the inter-
national community has had little effective ability to shape or curb U.S.
interventions through the active use of sanctions, even when U.S. actions-
were perceived as unjustified or illegal. The greatest, influence which the
international community has wielded has historically been over U.S. prestige
"when the focus narrows from overall power to emphasis on military
preparedness." (75) Cable draws a similar conclusion, but stresses a few not-
able exceptions, such as Israel's attack on the USS liberty in 1967 ( "Gun-
boat Diplomacy's Future," U.S. Naval Institute Press
,
(August 1966): 36), and




)6Cable, Diplomacy at Sea, 42.
57ibid., 43.

and diplomatic self-image. This can be a substantial restraint for a nation
like the United States whose citizenry has strong emotional ties to the
democratic tradition, and places great importance on the intrinsic value of
consensus in political relations, even in the international sphere. As Cable
observes, "sensitivity to international constraints tends to be proportional to
the international involvement of the state concerned. "58
There is one perspective from which this is readily apparent, and
that is the earlier stated sensitivity to gunboat diplomacy's perceived roots
in imperialism, and U.S. sensitivities to this perception. This attitude was
still prevalent, as late as 1972, as typified by one analysis of the political
effect of naval coercion on Third Yforld nations:
"The peoples of the Third World in particular do not
count on long-term developments. They think in terms of
today, and of what they can see. They are perhaps unable to
distinguish true seapower from maritime power. Thus,
demonstratively displayed presence, coupled with propaganda
and expansionist policies, is often honored politically to a higher
degree than its real worth justifies."" 9
According to the popular conception, gunboat diplomacy is, as Cable
wryly observes, "something that governments do to foreigners."60 From the
point of the view of the victim, rather than of the assailant, gunboat
diplomacy is perceived as "something which foreign governments do to
smaller countries." This is certainlv the conclusion to be drawn from an
58lbid.
59Admiral E. F. Weggener, FGN, "The Theory of Naval Strategy in the Nuclear





objective review of the list offered above. Of the S2 incidents during the last
decade which involved the use of U.S. naval force, only one of them (the
attempted recovery of the remains and "black box" from the Korean airliner
KAL-007) involved a confrontation at sea between the U.S. and an equivalent
naval power, the Soviet Union 61 Every other case involved a use of force or
attempted use of force by the United States against decidedly lesser states
which are, as Bull notes, "the traditional victims of this kind of naval
policy."62 In i960 he further observed that a consensus of smaller coastal
states in the United Nations
"have already so altered the international legal rules
relating to the use of force and magnified the costs of breaking
them as to have precluded the older kind of "gunboat
diplomacy', which assumed a set of rules weighted in favour of
the strong European powers and a division of the world into
fully and partially sovereign states. They will be able to appeal
to the prevailing Third World animus against interference by
the rich industrial states of East and ¥/est. . . .
"6"3
The best evidence that gunboat diplomacy is no longer accorded
its earlier authority as a means of demonstrating political intent or military
capabilities is the 1962 Law of trie Sea Convention. This convention
empowered coastal states with discretionary control over their territorial
seas out to twelve nautical miles from their coastline, and economic control
of their Exclusive Economic Zones out to 200 nautical miles. The provisions
which set out these sea echelons were designed and enacted with the




assistance and approval of the United States, which in 1960, recognized them
as binding under international law.64 The significance of this regime is that,
by precluding non-sanctioned maritime activity within twelve miles of a
nation's coast, the Convention prevents the United States (or any other
nation) from engaging in shows of naval force within visual sight from the
coast—the very area where "gunboat diplomacy" would have its traditionally
intended effect. One author has postulated that this development, will serve
as a form of arms control which will ultimately confine the world's navies to
their own territorial waters and those of their allies, and thus substantially
nullify the utility of naval forces for political purposes outside of outright
combat6^
More to the point, however, is that this codification of territorial
sovereignty seaward reinforces the notion that the coercive use of naval
forces is a relic from an earlier and less sophisticated era--and that the
United States recognises it as such. In the modern world "gunboat
diplomacy" has fallen into disrepute as a term for describing the use of naval
forces to achieve political objectives, owing largely to its oxymoronic quality.
Like the terms "military intelligence" and "military music," "gunboat
diplomacy" implies self-contradiction. Diplomacy carried out at the point
of a gun ceases to contain any element of civility, and is merely an act. of
coercion.
64
"United States: Presidential Proclamation on the Territorial Sea of the
United States," 27 December 1966, 26 International Legal Materials 264.
The fact that the United States and several other western industrialized
nations later refused to ratify the LOSC was a result, of disagreement over
the provisions governing deep seabed mining, and not over provisions
governing territorial rights.
^Elizabeth Young, "Military Implications of the Law of the Sea," Survival
(November 1 974): 267 (also cited in Bull, 11).

Coercive methods in diplomacy are generally controversial—all the
more so when they are perceived to violate international law, challenge the
sovereignty of other nations, or run contrary to accepted standards of
international behavior. One study cites considerable differences of opinion
regarding the legitimacy of coercive diplomacy even among analysts who
share a general consensus about its effectiveness in certain situations.66
Cable notes several reasons for the relevance of this perception. First, the
idea of an international order, and a common concern for individual rights
and the rights of national sovereignty have made intrusions into the
territorial waters of another nation widely regarded as illicit. Furthermore,
the use of violence by the regular armed forces of one nation against another
is regarded—for better or worse—as less permissible than an even greater
degree of violence by a tyrannical government or resistance movement
within the sovereign borders of another nation.67 In this regard, it is the
perception, rather than the facts of a situation, which make a difference.
The Perceptual Foundation of Gunboat Diplomacy
Perception and intent are the fundamental elements in the
successful application of coercive diplomacy. This notion lies at the heart of
Edward Luttwak's concept of "suasion," which is a particularly valuable way
66Mandel, 63.
67Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy. 1 02 . Witness also the current, debate about the
decision of the U.S. government not. to use its available military forces to
intercede in Iraq on the behalf or the Kurdish rebels,

of distinguishing between the relative political contents of the peacetime and
wartime uses of naval force. Luttwak writes,
"In wartime, the political uses of sea power are
naturally relegated to the background in the formulation of
naval strategy, which concentrates on combat capabilities. . . .
In the absence of general hostilities, however, a reverse priority
applies, and . . . the focus of Great Power naval strategy has
been shifting to missions that are "political" in the sense that
their workings rely on the reactions of others, and these are
reactions that naval deployments may evoke, but cannot
directly induce."68
Luttwak 's term "suasion" is appropriate to this political framework
because it "usefully suggests the indirectness of any political application of
naval force."69 The critical distinction is that "armed suasion is manifest
only in others' reactions," and operates "only through the filters of others'
perceptions."70 Any application of coercive naval force is based upon the
aggressor's perceptions of the victim's vulnerabilities and vital interests, and,
conversely, upon the victim's perceptions about, the aggressor's intentions,
capabilities and convictions.
The political liability inherent in the coercive use of naval force—
whether the specific act is a transit through a coastal state's adjacent waters,
the stationing of a carrier battiegroup outside a nation's largest port, or a
naval exercise conducted within radar range of a hostile coast—is that its
success is contingent upon the interpretation placed on that act by an
68Edward N. Luttwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power (Baltimore: Johns





independent second party --the victim—and the manner in which he chooses
to respond. The "fundamental stn&quanon" of suasion is the "cooperation"
of the target, in correctly interpreting the aggressors intent, and in behaving
predictably toward the desired outcome.71 To a large degree, therefore, the
political value reaped by an act of naval coercion is controlled by the victim
and not by the aggressor. Thus, gunboat diplomacy is a form of signalling
which is inherently unpredictable in its results 72 If the victim perceives an
alternative path of action which can achieve a political victory mitigating or
counterbalancing any military cost the aggressor can impose, the victim may
choose to react in a manner wholly unforeseen and unintended by the
aggressor. For this reason, the successful use of coercive diplomacy is
entirely dependent on an appreciation for the sensitivities of the intended
victim, and on an accurate assessment of his options and his anticipated
response.
This balance of perceptions and intentions is central to the
"symbolic" value of naval forces. It is precisely what warships symbolize by
way of a nation's commitment, its military capabilities, and its perceived
interests, which gives naval presence political value far beyond the relative
combat capability represented by a single ship, or even by a single naval
task force. Since the period of British naval dominance, a warship has
represented more than military capability alone. The sight of the Union jack
at the masthead historically meant that behind a British man-of-war stood
not just a fleet, but an empire as well—the "portent of potentially
overwhelming naval force.
"






"the symbolic ship symbolizes national rather than
naval power as such; its effectiveness is thus proportional to the
former, not to the latter. Naval power is of course a constituent
of national power but it need not be the salient source of
national power. . . 7*
In the contemporary world, however, the symbolic power of naval
vessels has been shown to be a sometimes fragile thing, tempered by
political considerations which weaken the deterrent or compellent value of
gunboat diplomacy, and by the relative vulnerability of naval forces to the
high-technology weapons available to nearly any state willing to commit its




IV. CONTEMPORARY LIMITS OF GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY
Recent Examples of Naval Intervention
"Perhaps the most difficult problem confronting any
student of coercive diplomacy is to discriminate between
success and failure in its results. Any judgment is bound to be
subjective and to depend on the uncertain answers to such
questions as: what was the purpose of the initiating
government; was it substantially achieved; was success lasting
or transitory; did it lead to war or other undesirable
consequences; was the result worth the cost of coercion?"
—Sir James Cable7^
Recent history has demonstrated the continuing relevance of naval
intervention beyond the mere presence of warships as a demonstration of
commitment or national resolve. The advantages which naval forces afford
for diplomatic posturing and deterrence, crisis response, and military inter-
vention have been catalogued by numerous scholars 76 Attesting to this is
^Diplomacy at Sea. 21.
76James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy: Political implications of Limited Naval
Force. (London: Chatto and Windus, 1971), 116; Kenneth Booth. Navies and
Foreign Policy (New York: Holmes & Meier, Inc., 1979), 33; E. F. Gueritz,
Norman Friedman, Clarence A Robinson, and W. R. Van Cleave, eds., NATO's

the wide array of naval operations since I960 which have exercised U.S.
ability to project force in Third World crisis scenarios. This list includes.
• Forcible hostage rescue (Iran hostage rescue attempt, I960).
• Evacuation of U. S. officials or foreign nationals from hostile
situations in foreign territories (Evacuation of civilians from
Grenada, 1963- More recently, from Monrovia Liberia, Decem-
ber 1991; and Mogadishu, Somalia, January 1992).
• Pre-emptive strikes against terrorists planning to commit violent
acts, or retaliatory strikes following a terrorist attack (Libya, 1966)
• Support, of law enforcement authorities in the forcible apprehen-
sion of known terrorists or other international fugitives
(Achille Lauro Incident, 1965; arrest of Manuel Noriega, 1989).
• Armed escort to U. S.-flag merchant shipping in combat zones
(Persian Gulf Tanker Escort Operation, 1967).
• Protection of U S property and U S embassies in foreign lands
when local authorities prove inadequate or disinclined (Reinforce-
ment of U. S. military forces to Panamanian bases, 1967-69).
• Interdiction of narcotics traffickers (Caribbean Anti -Narcotics
Operations since 1962).
• Combat support operations against insurgents in host countries
sponsored by the U. S. (El Salvador since 1962; assistance to
Aquino government during 1969 Philippine coup attempt).
Maritime Strategy: Issues and Developments (New York: Pergammon -
Brassey 's Pub., 1 967), 3 1 . Blechman and Kaplan, 4 1
.

• Combat operations against violators of ceasefires during U.S.
peacekeeping operations (Lebanon, 196.3)
• Limited strikes or forced insertion of U. S. forces to protect U.S.
security interests, or at the request of foreign governments
(Grenada, 1963; and most recently, Saudia Arabia, 199 1) 77
Each of these incidents represents an example of the use of U.S.
naval forces to protect national interests in low intensity conflicts which
went well beyond a simple demonstration of capability or intent, to the
actual use of force. The current naval strategy—with its emphasis on
forward presence and crisis response—is designed to maximize U.S.
capabilities for the use of force in just such circumstances. A strategy based
on a realistic and demonstrated requirement for force projection capabilities
offers the U.S. an historic opportunity to design its naval force and oper-
ations around real, rather than hypothesized, military missions.
And yet there are dangers inherent in such a strategy, as well.
Despite the frequently belligerent rhetoric and massive military preparation
which characterized the last forty-five years, the U.S. and Soviet militaries
never engaged in combat. What was tested during the Cold War was not the
combat capabilities of the superpowers, but the effectiveness of their
conventional and nuclear deterrence strategies. The contribution of the U.S.
Navy's Maritime Strategy to the deterrence of global war cannot be easily
77 List of LIC missions from Bernard F. McMahon, "Low-Intensity Conflict:
The Pentagon's Foible,
"
QRBIS. $4 (Winter 1990) 2; with some modification.
Obviously, this list addresses only the use or attempted use of naval power,
without any considerations for the relative success or failure of the missions.

denied, given the obvious results, and the apparent recent withdrawal of the
Soviet Navy from the race for maritime superiority.
The new naval strategy, on the other hand, will have the singular
disadvantage of being constantly tested against real-world adversaries who
are not constrained by fears of cataclysmic escalation. The continuing
potential for regional crises in the emerging multi-polar world means the
U.S. Navy is no less likely now than during the past decade of finding itself in
close proximity to some Third World conflict. And as the preceding list
demonstrates, the mixed results of U.S. naval interventions in the last decade
leads one to conclude that the application of this new naval strategy
deserves careful consideration.
The fundamental importance of perception to the success of naval
diplomacy, as Luttwak described it, is not limited solely to the impact of
perceptions on an adversary or a victim state. It is equally important for
the continued support of the American public for U.S. overseas policy, and
for their support for the Navy as an executor of that policy, as Huntington
pointed out. Numerous highly memorable and well-publicized images of the
last decade— 1/55 Sfef& heeled sharply to port, U.S. frigates following in the
wake of the damaged Jfrytfg&tm l/SS N$w firs$y shelling the Shouf
Mountains overlooking Beirut, and the plasma displays in USS Vinc^nn^s
Combat Information Center --are evocative of a foreign and naval policy
which were excessively vulnerable to politically embarrassing and tactically
lethal miscalculations.
Given the volatility of the current geopolitical environment, the
relevant issue for U.S. naval planning is not when or where naval force
should be employed (which for the United States is predominantly a political

decision), but, rather, how. To this end, it is instructive to review some of
the lessons of recent uses of U.S. naval force.
U.S. Intervention in Lebanon, March 1962 - March 1964
Of the military interventions in recent years, U.S. involvement in
Lebanon was the most unequivocally a failure. From the arrival of the first
U.S. Marine forces on 17 March 1962, until their "redeployment" out of the
area on 30 March 1964, the operation was an exercise in frustration, not
only for the personnel involved in the U.S. peace-keeping force and their
support elements afloat, but for the entire Reagan administration. The
original objective to restore peace to the immediate region in order that a
legitimate government could regain its equilibrium was a seemingly innocent
objective, but for U.S. forces, there was no way to accomplish that goal
without being viewed as an interloper and becoming pulled into the fighting.
Eight years later, the effect of U.S. involvement on the immediate or long-
term stability of that country has been indiscernible
The U.S. intervention in Lebanon is also the most certain example
of the inappropriate use of military force to achieve a political objective.
That fact, has been commented on by numerous analysts, and was the
specific finding in the investigative report, of the Commission investigating
the bombing of Marine Headquarters in Beirut, 78 which noted:
78Admiral Robert Long, USN, Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut
International Airport Terrorist Act, October 2\. 1Q6.1 (U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1984). See also Michael D. Maione, William H. Wheeler and

"The commission concludes that U.S. decisions as
regards Lebanon taken over the past fifteen months have been,
to a large degree, characterized by an emphasis on military
options and the expansion of the U.S. military role, notwith-
standing the fact that the conditions upon which the security of
the USMNF were based continued to deteriorate as progress
toward a diplomatic solution slowed. . . . The Commission
therefore concludes that there is an urgent need for
reassessment of alternative means to achieve U.S. objectives in
Lebanon and at the same time reduce the risk to the USMNF."79
The U.S. Marine and Navy forces were deployed to Lebanon as an
element of a Multi-National Force (MNF) tasked with "peace-keeping" among
the numerous warring factors in and around Lebanon. U.S. military presence
and neutrality were seen by the U.S. Administration as essential to assisting
the Lebanese government in restoring its control over the divided country.
And it was the neutrality of U.S. forces—rather than their military capability,
per se—which was the principle basis for establishing and maintaining U.S.
authority as an impartial enforcer of the peace. Confusion about the nature
of the U.S. military mission in Lebanon, as evidenced by the the various
interpretations of "neutrality/' "peace -keeping" and "presence," and how
those terms came to impact the rules of engagement (ROE) at various levels
of the operational chain of command, was a principal contributing factor to
the ultimate disaster at the Marine Headquarters in Beirut 80





As the perception of U.S. neutrality began to erode, (the inevitable
result of U.S. military actions taken to protect their own forces) the U.S. lost
its mandate in the eyes of the belligerents as an neutral arbiter 81 There
were five separate responses taken by U.S. military forces in Lebanon which
served to undermine the effectiveness of the USNMF: (1) the training of the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) of the Gernayal government, (2) the use of
naval gunfire, rather than U.S. Marine artillery, to silence gun emplacements
endangering Marine Corps positions; (3) the use of F- 14 aircraft for
reconnaissance flights intended to locate artillery emplacements within
Beirut; (4) support for the occupation of the Chouf mountains by the LAF
and, consequently (S) the necessity to support the LAF through direct
military action—notably, further naval gunfire and air interdiction against
Druze and Shi'ite forces in the hills surrounding the town of Suq-Al-Gharb.82
Each of these instances represented a justifiable use of force in
order to effectively enable the U.S. Marines on station in Lebanon to safely
execute their mission. However, as the Long Commission report stated,
"there was a fundamental conflict between the peace-keeping mission
provided through the chain of command to the USMNF, and the increasingly
active role that, the United States was taking in support of the LAF."8
'
; In
choosing to take those actions, there was insufficient consideration given to
the manner in which each instance would be perceived and interpreted by
the individual factions at war in Lebanon. Actions favorable to any
81Admiral Long*s report (p. 42) concluded that "the public statements; of
factional leaders confirmed that a portion of the Lebanese populace no
longer considered the UNMNF neutral."




particular side of the conflict were certain to jeopardize the appearance of
U.S. neutrality. Furthermore, any interdiction by an outside agent into what
was essentially a civil war --particularly by a nation like the United States
which, through its traditional support of Israel, would never be seen as a
neutral party--could be guaranteed to arouse political enmities. Thus, the
U.S. efforts, however well-intentioned, were virtually assured of failure.
As Malone points out, the specific use of naval gunfire and, later air
reconnaissance and interdictions from the aircraft carrier EisenJjouw was
almost certainly viewed as an escalation of the conflict by a third party who
possessed superior firepower.84 The inability of the impressive American
forces to deal effectively with the regional powers, or more fundamentally to
deter their attacks on the garrisoned Marines, is a graphic illustration of the
limitations of overwhelming force, when eariier actions --i.e. the declaration
and strict maintenance of U.S. neutrality—had already bounded the potential
for effective military response. h$ James Cable observed, "sometimes two
policemen can do more that a carrier battlegroup."8 -'
As much as U.S. commanders on scene and decision-makers within
the U.S. Administration may have misjudged the effect of their military
actions, there was corresponding tactical brilliance on the part of the
opposition forces in choosing their means of neutralizing U.S. involvement.
The successful terrorist attack on the U.S. Marine Headquarters in Beirut
achieved utter tactical surprise, with negligible loss of life on the part of the
terrorists (i.e. one highly-motivated truck driver). As compared to the
sophisticated weapons of U.S. forces in the region, the terrorist weapon was
84Malone, et al, 429.
8
->Cabie, Diplomacy at Sea. 106.

inexpensive, simple, and totally effective. More significantly, it had a
devastating effect upon the perceptions of the American people, thus
accomplishing in one instance what U.S. forces in the region were unable to
accomplish against the factions opposing the Gernayal government, x^drniral
Long noted,
"The use of terrorism to send a political or ideological
message . . . depends on the nature and breadth of media
coverage. The political message in the 23 October 1953 attack
was one of opposition to the U.S. military presence in Lebanon.
An attack of sufficient magnitude could rekindle political debate
over U.S. participation in the MNF and possibly be the catalyst
for a change of U.S. policy."86
In short, Lebanon was a situation which could not have been
resolved by the use of American military force, in any fashion which
professed to stand as mediation. The resultant "redeployment" of U.S.
Marines and their ultimate departure from the area only served to illustrate
the limitations of even extraordinary military power in situations which are
not conducive to military solutions. James Cable observed,
"Every kind of coercive diplomacy has been
attempted, by numerous governments, during the last fifteen
years, in relation to the continuing crisis in the Lebanon, but the
situation in that country has never crystallized long enough to
warrant any judgment that a particular foreign government had
either succeeded or failed in its purpose. The same
consideration applies to the remarkable variety of methods 87
86Lone. 12*,.
87Cable, Diplomacy at Sea. 2
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U.S. Naval Operations off Libya, August 1961 - April 1966
Notwithstanding his skepticism regarding Lebanon, Cable also
wrote, "If there is a worse mistake than believing coercive diplomacy to be
a reliable expedient, it is to assume that it never works."88 This is an
appropriate summary of the U.S. use of naval and air power against Muamar
Kadhaffi's government in Libya in 1966. In sharp contrast to the result of
U.S. intervention in Lebanon., which achieved no discernible improvement in
the stability of the region, the U.S. raid on Libya, resulted in an immediate
cessation in Libya's overt involvement in world terrorism which has lasted
to the present.89
The differences in the motivation, circumstances, planning and
execution of U.S. actions against Libya could not stand in sharper contrast to
the events and results arising from the use of force in Lebanon. Most
striking—and perhaps most significant for the success of the mission—was
that the U.S. actions against Libya were conceived to accomplish limited
objectives, and were only attempted after all other available options had
been exhausted. Nevertheless, the fact that the U.S. was ultimately required
to use force provides a further lesson on the limits of naval intervention in
certain circumstances.
Since the early 1970s, Libya had engaged in a series of acts which
had demonstrated the state's support for international terrorism, and which
88 Ibid., 23.
39Brian Breedham, "As the Tanks Rumble Away" The Economist
.
1 September 1990, 6.

had been particularly nettling for the the United States. In October 197.3,
Libya declared that the Gulf of Sidra was Libyan territorial waters, in clear
violation of international law. Tensions between the U.S. and Libya
culminated in August. 1961, with the downing of two Libyan SU-22 fighters
by U.S. carrier-based F-14s during a freedom of navigation exercise in the
Gulf of Sidra by two U.S. carrier battlegroups. (See Appendix 2).
Then in mid- 1965 a further spate of terrorism inflamed relations
between die two nations. Over a period of four months preceding the U.S.
raid on Tripoli, from January until April, 1966, the United States made
numerous attempts to deter Libya from its espoused involvement in
terrorist activities. These measures included both quiet and postured
diplomatic statements, the recall of all U.S. citizens from Libya, the freezing
of Libyan assets in U.S. institutions, and extensive diplomatic efforts, in
cooperation with European allies, aimed at isolating Libya socially and
economically.90 These efforts climaxed with a second freedom of navigation
exercise by three U.S. carrier battlegroups in March 1966, during which U.S.
aircraft sunk two Libyan patrol boats and destroyed Libyan shore-based
missile radar sites, after the Libyans had fired two surface-to-air missiles.
From the political perspective, the objectives of U.S. naval actions
against Libya up to that point constituted a controlled escalation of relations
between the two states, which erupted into combat only when Libyan ait-
forces challenged U.S. rights on the high seas. The purpose of U.S. freedom of
navigation exercises was to demonstrate continued U.S. intentions to operate
in an important Mediterranean exercise area, and to assure the Libyans that
^Frederick Zilian, "The U. S. Raid on Libya and NATO." ORB IS 30 (Fall
1966):499.

the U.S. would not be deterred by rhetoric.91 Significantly, all efforts up to
that point, including the two fatal encounters between Libyan and U.S.
aircraft, failed to deter Kadhaffi from anti-Western rhetoric and activities.
The final act, the bombing of the Ls 3?J1? discotheque in West-
Berlin, was traced directly to Libyan operatives and prompted the U.S. to a
coercive use of force against Libya in an effort to make an unequivocal
statement about the price to be paid for further terrorism. The air strike on
Libyan military targets in and around Tripoli on 14 April 1966, made that
statement.
There were four elements of the use force which impacted directly
on the accomplishment of the mission in this case: (1) the clarity of U.S.
objectives; (2) strength of U.S. motivation over that of Libya; (3) useable
military options; and (4) Libya's fear of unacceptable escalation.92 As com-
pared to its actions in Lebanon, U.S. intentions toward Libya were clear-cut
and well communicated during the months preceding the actual use of force.
At the least, the U.S. desired to put an end to Libya's support for
international terrorism. It was further desirable to make Kadhaffi's
continued leadership of Libya untenable, either by emasculating his ability
to influence regional events and undercutting his support by other Arab
League rulers, or more preferably, by setting in motion a political turnover
in Libya which would remove him from power. While the former goal was
91 W. Hays Parks, Colonel USMCR, "Crossing the Line." U. S. Naval Institute
Proceedings (November 1966): 40
y2Tim Zimmerman, "The American Bombing of Libya: A Success for Coercive
Diplomacy?" Survival 29 (May/June 1967): 207. Zimmerman draws
broadly on eight elements outlined in Alexander George's Limits of Coercive
Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971). For
purposes of this discussion regarding the specific use of naval force, four of
those elements seem directly applicable.

an obviously legitimate one, recognized and supported by all the major U.S.
allies, the second had been tainted by the Reagan administration's frequently
inflammatory rhetoric and thus probably served to steel Kadhaffi's resolve
and also to alienate some of the support that might other-wise have been
forthcoming from the allies 9 '-'
There was ample incentive for the U.S. to use force against Libya to
secure its aims. Above the realistic desire to eliminate a documented source
of terrorism worldwide, the U.S. was motivated to maintain its credibility
with the more moderate Arab governments, and also to bolster its leadership
against terrorism in the eyes of its European neighbors who had seen the
greatest number of terrorist acts committed on their soil. Measured against
the motivation of the Libvans to continue alone their belligerent path, the
t D O X
ultimate use of force can retrospectively be demonstrated to have been the
action which conclusively shifted the balance of determination in favor of
the United States.
Here it is again significant that the molding of Libya's actions was
directly related to Kadhaffi's perceptions of U.S. willingness to resort to
ultimate means in order to impose its will. The earlier uses of U.S. naval
force during freedom of navigation exercises were insufficient to make this
point, even though they repeatedly demonstrated the vulnerability of
Libyan defenses against clearly superior U.S. forces and technology. All
attempts leading up to the actual strike on Libya did not provide a strong
enough deterrent effect, due to a lack of U.S. credibility. The perception of
the Libyans up to that point was that the U.S. lacked the will, if not the
means, to take the steps necessary to enforce their words. The key issue for
93zimmerman,208.

the American administration was in finding the correct method and objective
to demonstrate its motivation and to test the limits of Kadhaffi s.
From the military perspective, the single most important aspect of
the use of force was that there were useable military options available to
demonstrate U.S. will and capabilities. This means not only that the correla-
tion of forces favored the U.S., but that there were justifiable military targets
whose elimination would contribute to the overall U.S. objectives. The
Libyan air defense sites which had been used to target and control Libyan
aircraft in strikes against U.S. carriers., and the known training camps and
military headquarters from which Libya exported terrorist groups, were
targets with obvious tactical value, even if no other goai was achieved than
their destruction. Moreover, the use of force as a last resort, rather than the
first or concurrent resort, as in the case of Lebanon, made the U.S. cause
more justifiable in both domestic and allied eyes.
Finally, the threat of unacceptable escalation, made implicit by the
U.S.'s gradual escalation of the level of conflict, demonstrated U.S. resolve
and capability, while leaving an option available for the modification of
Libyan behavior. In discussing the use of "armed suasion" in peacetime,
Luttwak notes that one of the critical elements in the effective use of force is
that its application be limited. As long as the purpose and contest of the use
of force remains "political," that is, intended to evoke suasion rather than to
destroy enemy forces or values,
"the political use of symbolic forces does require that
the target, state recognize its symbolic nature, i.e., that the
damage inflicted has been d^Jit^^t^lv minimized. This in turn
requires the deploying state to discriminate successfully

between what is and what is not symbolic in terms of others'
perceptions, which may be quite different from its own."94
Zimmerman cites an equivalent observation of Thomas Schelling
that, "it is not the pain and damage itself but its influence on someone's
behavior that matters. It is the expectation of more violence that gets the
wanted behavior, if the power to hurt can get it at all."9 -'
While the effect of the U.S. bombing raid on Kadhaffi's
headquarters and military infrastructure has had the demonstrably success-
ful result of curbing Libyan terrorism (and terrorism worldwide, to some
degree), it was unsuccessful in achieving the ulterior motive of hastening
Kadhaffi's overthrow. This has been attributed, among other things, to the
fact that the Libyan military was so discredited and demoralized at their
inability to defend against or to get off even a single response to the U.S.
strike, that there was inadequate popular support for the initiation of a coup
by the otherwise wholly disaffected military leadership 96
U.S.- actions had the further effect of solidifying allied support for
anti -terrorist operations, even if public claims of support from allied
governments were muted or nonexistent. The most significant example of
this was that the French—whose government had refused overflight rights
for the British-based USAF FB-1 1 Is, thus more than doubling the round-trip
distance required for the strike—supported the U.S. raid by a 708
majority 97 The fact that the U.S. was required to take a unilateral action in
94Luttwak, 6.
^•Thomas Shelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1966), 62; cited in Zimmerman 2 14, note 40.




this case, despite the vested interest of the NATO countries in ending
imported terrorism, was more an indication of the diversity of European
domestic politics, and the continuing sensitivity of NATO to any flexing of
military might which could have intimidated the Soviets and thus upset die
slowly improving East-West relations 98 Nevertheless, the U.S. military
actions, and the demonstration of resolve (and military competence) which it
exhibited had the effect of galvanizing the European nations into taking a
notably less tolerant stand toward terrorism in general, and toward
renegade nations like Libya, specifically.
U.S. Naval Operations in the Persian Gulf, 1957-1 956*
Compared to the relative clarity with which the results of naval
intervention in Lebanon and Libya may be analyzed, U.S. naval operations in
the Persian Gulf during the latter days of the Iran-Iraq War are much more
problematic. Considered in the aggregate, the evaluation of U.S. actions in
the Persian Gulf exemplifies the difficulty in weighing deterrence against the
costs of deterrence. The relatively heavy price paid by the U.S., and in
particular by the U.S. Navy, in terms of lives lost (both military and civilian),
vessels damaged, tactical and public relations mistakes made, and national
and institutional prestige lost, cannot be easily balanced against the
speculative value of even greater war-time damages prevented by the
presence of U.S. naval forces in the region. Nevertheless, there is a real case
)id., 523.

to be made that U.S. actions could not have been easily avoided without
long-term, and largely unforeseeable repercussion for later U.S. foreign
policy.
Initially it must be admitted that the actions taken in the Persian
Gulf—which almost exclusively involved the use of U.S. naval forces—were
not the result of a coherent policy decision or the pursuit of an identifiable
goal, as in the case of the Libyan air strike, or even (to a somewhat lesser
degree) in the case of the stationing of the Multi-National Force in Lebanon.
U.S. decisions in the Persian Gulf, beginning with the U.S. escort of Kuwaiti
tankers, were incremental responses to the heightening conditions of the
Iran-Iraq War, rather than an earlier policy executed in the face of an
ongoing war" The U.S. had no stated interest in the outcome of the War,
except, to prevent it from impacting on other peripheral interests. Indeed,
the U.S. had no formal ties to either Iran or Iraq, and only informal
preference for Iraq by virtue of U.S. antipathy toward Iran, remaining from
the earlier Iran-Hostage Crisis. 100 U.S. actions throughout can best be
described, using President Reagan's term, as "proportionate responses" to the
escalating events brought on by die Iran-Iraq War.
"On this particular point analysts are uniformly in agreement. See in
particular Janice Gross Stein, "The U. S. in the Gulf: The Wrong Strategy in
the Right Place," International Security. 13 (Winter oo/69): 143; and
Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf and the West: Strategic relations and
Military Realities (London: Westview Press, 1966): 351-443.
lOOrjonald E. Neuchterlein, "Changing Perceptions of U.S. National Interests in
the South Atlantic and Middle East," in James Brown and William P. Snyder,
eds. The Regionalization of WarfareThe Falkland/Maivinas Islands,
Lebanon, and the Iran -Irag Conflict . (New Brunswick: Transaction Books,
1965), 214.

On the broad scale, U.S. interests in the Gulf were two -fold, based
on the intention to prevent the Soviet Union from extending its influence
into the Persian Gulf region, and to ensure the safe flow of oil as a strategic
commodity for Western societies. 101 Preoccupation with countering Soviet
influence grew out of the need to ensure that stability problems in the area
were not further complicated by Soviet attempts to broaden their influence,
and also by the desire to restrain the Soviet Union's historic attempt to attain
access to a warm-water port. Ensuring the continued flow of oil was
important, for its own sake—particularly in retrospect of the 197.3 OPEC
embargo--but also as a means for the United States to support the vitality of
the European and Japanese economies as strategic underpinnings for the
free-world economy
.
The problems which arose from attempting to devise and execute
an operational military mission around so vague a set of principles,
illustrates the difficulty in translating an objective into an operable strategy.
Thus, as the Iran-Iraq war widened to endanger commercial shipping and oil
production facilities in the region, the U.S. responded by expanding its
Middle East Force, in order to protect shipping, signify ongoing U.S. interests,
contain the expansion of the war and the potential for an Iranian victory and
a further spread of Moslem fundamentalism, and ensure that the Soviets did
not gain advantage through a broadening of their influence. This was the
101Gary Sick, "The United States and the Persian Gulf," in The Gulf War:
Regional and International Dimensions Hans W. Maull and Otto Pick, eds.
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), 12 1; and Donald E. Neuchterlem, "U. S.
National Interests in the Middle East: Is the Persian Gulf a 'Bridge too Far?"
Naval War College Review. (Winter 1969): 114.

catalyst lor the U.S. acceptance of the Kuwaiti offer to reflag and escort their
tankers.
The numerous incidents which arose during the period of U.S.
intercession in the Gulf War—the successful Iraqi attack on IfSS Start, the
mining of the supertanker Bridgeton, the sinking of an Iraqi minelayer and
recovery of its mines, the mining of USS Samuel 3. Roberts and the ensuing
destruction of half of Iran's major warships, the U.S. shelling of Iranian oil
platforms, and the destruction of IranAJr Flight 655 by &S$ vmcennes to
name the most significant--have been examined by political analysts,
technicians, naval officers and government officials. Specific failures have
been attributed to equipment design flaws, tactical and human errors by
those on scene, miscalculations on the part of the U.S. commanders,
ambiguities in the rules of engagement, underestimates of the assets and
determination of the Iranian and Iraqi belligerents, and a general lack of
cultural and strategic understanding on the part of the U.S. administration.
Considered only over the period of time during which U.S. forces
were actually employed in the war zone, positive results are difficult to find
among the series of errors. Indeed, U.S. efforts in the Persian Gulf have
been characterized by Janice G. Stein as a failure on the strategic levei
because they failed on the tactical level:
"The commitment of American naval forces to escort
Kuwaiti tankers through the Gulf and the progressive
broadening of their mission in the midst of an ongoing war was
the wrong strategy in the right, plate. ... It was poorly
conceived because its targets were unclear and its scope
ambiguous; it was ineffective because it did not achieve its
stated gosJ of deterring attacks against shipping in the Gulf,
and it was dangerous because it provoked the actions it was

designed to deter and risked entrapping the United States in a
process of uncontrolled escalation."102
The more reasonable and balanced assessment offered by Anthony
Cordesman is perhaps a truer reflection of the ambiguities of the situation in
which U.S. naval forces operated :
"It is clear that the U.S. in some ways blundered into
the Gulf, and that the West will now have to stay in the Gulf
until it can collectively blunder out of it. What is far from clear,
however, is that the U.S. really had any choice other than to
attempt to "muddle through". The U.S. unquestionably could
have done many things better, but history is not kind in
providing unambiguous needs for action. If history is painful to
those who act too quickly, it can be devastating to those who act
too slowly. This is particularly true of the defense of long-term
strategic interests: where the assertion of a strong and
continuing regional presence is essential to success." 1 '-^
Realistically, perhaps the worst that can be said is that the U.S.
decision to interpose its naval forces in the center of a war zone, between
two notoriously vindictive adversaries, demonstrates how little U.S. policy-
makers had learned by the failure of U.S. efforts in Lebanon, only five years
earlier—and during the same U.S. administration. Indeed, the similarities
between the two interventions are striking: the U.S. decides to take the
leadership in what is hoped will be an international coalition, due to broad
and ill -defined strategic goals which are not of vital interest to the United
States, and chooses to exert its influence via military means due to a lack of




diplomatic or political leverage in any other sphere. The results are likewise
similar: the belligerents view U.S. presence as an intervention by a superior
military force which hinders their prosecution of an independent struggle;
both powers successfully exploit U.S. stated "neutrality" by attacking it along
the margins of its rules of engagement; U.S. forces incrementally escalate the
struggle and come into danger of being trapped by their stated policies; the
situation is finally concluded only by the catalytic effect of an extraordinary
tragedy in which hundreds of innocent lives are lost.
Ultimately, one of the most significant lessons to come out of the
Persian Gulf operations should have been the most obvious, that naval
operations are inherently risky, and are even more so in a war zone. To this
can be added the well-documented ambiguities resulting from uncertain
political objectives, which translated to uncertainty in the rules of engage-
ment, and in their implementation. The evidence rising from the series of
otherwise "unrelated incidents" leads to the conclusion that the overall
mission was of questionable success, largely because the strategy was too ill-
defined to provide a proper gauge for the measurement of its success.
On the other hand, what can be said about U.S. policy in the Persian
Gulf is that it demonstrated unequivocally that, the United States was willing
to go substantial distances, and pay an operational and political price which
no other nation could have borne, in order to make good on its claims of the
strategic value of the Persian Gulf and its interest in regional stability. The
benefits of this sort of diplomatic constancy have only become apparent
within the last six months.

V. CONCLUSIONS
"In many cases, naval demonstrations have made it
possible to achieve political goals, without resorting to an armed
struggle merely by exerting pressure through one's own
potential power and by threatening to initiate military
hostilities. Thus the navy has always been an instrument of
state policy, and an important support for diplomacy in
peacetime. This is fostered by the very nature of a navy and
the properties inherent in it namely a constant high degree of
combat readiness, mobility, and the ability to concentrate one's
own forces in selected areas of the ocean in a short time.
— Admiral of the Soviet Fleet Sergei G. Gorshkov 104
It has been shown that the evolution in the U.S. National Security
Strategy during the last two years has established forward presence and
crisis intervention in regional conflicts as the prevailing missions for United
States naval forces in the future. These missions are likely to continue for
the foreseeable future, not only because of the predictable reduction in U.S.
overseas bases, but because regional instabilities which could endanger U.S.
interests are virtually certain to continue.
104 S.G. Goshkov, Sea Power of the State (Moscow: Military Publishing House,
1976), cited in Uri Ra,anan, Robert. Pfaltsgraff, Jr., and Geoffrey Kemp, eds.
Power Projection: Perspectives. Perceptions and Problems )Hamden: Archon
Books, 1962),26.

As a result of its military victory in Operation DESERT SHIELD, the
United States now stands in an extraordinary position with respect to its
military and political relations in the Third World. In effect, the United
States was able to capitalize on an opportunity which was not afforded by
any previous use of force against a regional power: it was able to
demonstrate what can be lost when a lesser power attempts; to challenge a
major power in the purely military plane where the actions of the two
contestants are completely unfetterred by ancillary political considerations.
The obvious conclusion, more than any action in recent memory., is likely to
buy the U.S. conventional deterrence against regional adversaries for years
to come—if die capital is wisely invested.
Lessons of Operation DESERT SHIELD
Inasmuch as the most recent use of U.S. military power, Operation
DESERT SHIELD, is not yet concluded, only the most obvious of its lessons can
be offered at this point. Nevertheless, some of those lessons have a direct
bearing on the issue at hand: i.e., what the recent uses of U.S. naval force can
provide as guidelines for the current, naval strategy The first of those
lessons is what DESERT SHIELD demonstrates about the value of U.S. naval
operations in the Persian Gulf three years ago.
One of the criticisms offered by Janice Stein is that the United
States

"put the cart before the horse: rather than deterrence
dictating the need for credibility and resolve., it was concern
with reputation, credibility, and resolve that dictated the
extension of deterrence. Once American forces were deployed,
officials defended their continued presence not by the intrinsic
interests at stake but largely in terms of the damage to
American credibility that would ensue from their
withdrawal. 1°5
While this undoubtedly seemed like a valid criticism at the time,
and drove to the heart of U.S. impetuousness in thrusting itself into the
Persian Gulf War, hindsight has demonstrated that the reputation of the
United States, and its perceived reliability as an ally, was the foundation of
the successful coalition operations in DESERT SHIELD.
The U.S. has maintained a naval presence in the Persian Gulf since
1946. Often that presence had been the only official U.S. representation in
the region. The consistency of purpose demonstrated, and the numerous
military and diplomatic contacts gained during that period (to say nothing of
the bonds created through the more recent military assistance programs)
was a significant contributor to the perception on the part of Arab states that
the United States had a genuine interest in the security of the region and
was consistent in its approach to preserving that stability. This perception
could only have been reinforced by the persistence exhibited by U.S. naval
forces (and the U.S. government) during the Iran-Iraq War, when the U.S.
suffered numerous politically embarrassing and costly losses to ite own
forces. While the Reagan Administration's reliance on "proportionate




criticism among some circles in the U.S., the demonstration of U.S. restraint
may have further served to enforce the view of moderate Arab nations that
the U.S. was acting in as balanced a manner as circumstances would allow.
The strength of moderate Arab perceptions became evident with
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The request of the Saudi government for U.S.
assistance, their offer of basing and staging rights—as well as the fuel for U.S.
aircraft and vehicles—and the strength of the Coalition both diplomatically
and operationally, can all be directly attributed to the long-standing
relations between the United States and the Gulf states. This was based in
no small degree on the presence of U.S. naval forces in the Gulf since shortly
after the Second World War.
On the other hand, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is an equally valid
demonstration of the limits of naval presence. In spite of the conspicuous
earlier support of the Kuwaiti government represented by the reflagging and
escorting operation, that experience, and the continued U.S. presence of the
Navy's Middle East Force, were insufficient to deter Iraq from its aggression.
Indeed, this same lesson can also be seen in the fact that the Libyans failed
to be deterred in 1966 by the presence of a superior U.S. naval force
operating in their "territorial waters". Clearly there are limits to what can be
accomplished by naval presence when a foreign power accredits the U.S.
with a lack of political will.
Current claims by the Navy and the U.S. government that its rapid
response deterred the further invasion of Iraqi forces into Saudi Arabia may
be correct. However, that claim cannot be made without the corresponding
acknowledgement that an established, historic naval presence failed to
prevent the Iraqi invasion, as it had earlier failed to prevent Libyan
terrorism or the expansion of the Iran-Iraq War. In this regard, Janice

Stein's observations about the limits of extended deterrence are decidedly
accurate.
A further lesson of the most recent conflict is that the US public is
unlikely to support future military operations which cannot be shown to be
grounded in American values, winnable in the short term, and inexpensive
in lives and monetary cost. The most dramatic lessons of DESERT STORM—
the effectiveness of U.S. weapons systems, and the ability of U.S. forces to
wage a conflict with minimal casualties or collateral damage—will prove to
be a determining factor in future U.S. military commitments. It is highly
unlikely that the American public or the Congress will tolerate the sort of
losses incurred or the tactical errors made during the earlier Persian Gulf
operation without obvious, demonstrable advances in reconciling or ending
the conflict. Similarly, once the U.S. has arrived at a decision to resort to
force, the increasing lethality of combat environments will make it essential
for U.S. forces to achieve the decisive superiority necessary for quick victory
with minimal casualties.
This could have a significant consequences for future naval
operations and on the professional credibility of the Navy as an institution,
particularly in the event that the U.S. naval forces are tasked to operate in
the sort of political and military quagmire which characterized the Lebanon
and Persian Gulf operations. Under the new "crisis response strategy", the
Army and Air Force would be only rarely forward deployed—particularly as
U.S. overseas bases begin to decline—and therefore would rarely enter
theater of operations before a crisis demanded intervention through combat.
The Navy, on the other hand, will continue to serve as the forward deployed
military representative of the U.S. government. That will subject it to

exactly the sort of unpredictable and increasingly dangerous threats typified
by the missiles., patrol boats, mines and terrorists of the Persian Gull" and
Mediterranean. Dealing with such threats will demand that the U.S. Navy
pay increasing attention to the requirements of low-intensity conflict and to
the imaginative use of limited military resources which has characterized
Third World adversaries. In this regard, U.S. military failures in Lebanon
and in the Persian Gulf are instructive.
The distinctive similarity about all four examples cited--Lebanon,
Libya, the Persian Gulf and Operation DESERT STORM—is that in each case
the United States was met with a progressively more credible and lethal
opposing force, characterized by the incorporation of some of the world's
most capable weapons systems, and where not—notably in Lebanon and
with die use of mines by Iran—by an imaginative and surprisingly effective
use of cruder weapons. The lesson for future military operations is that the
proliferation of technologically advanced weapons and knowledge of jpw to
employ them effectively has blurred the distinction between the "Third
World" or regional power and a global power to the point where there is no
longer a militarily significant difference. Thus the overwhelming use of
force brought to bear in the U.S. strikes on Libya and Iraq is not just a
political expedient to maximize the brevity of the combat, it is essential to
eliminate an adversary's means of defense and reprisal. Future military
operations in any environment should be planned around the immediate use
of the maximum firepower available, once combat is initiated.
Perhaps the most significant of die lessons of DESERT SHIELD is
wThat it was not. As successful as die operation was, it would be imprudent

for U.S. planners and officials to consider it a paradigm for the resolution of
future regional conflicts. It is highly unlikely that future conflicts would
occur in a region where the U.S. could count on the friendly support of
adjacent nations; where U.S. forces would have virtually unrestricted use of
runways, pier facilities, staging areas, and a modern transportation
infrastructure; where there would be a satisfactory period of training and
preparation, and relatively flawless intelligence; and where the seaborne
transport of logistics supplies and combat equipment would go unchallenged
by enemy air or submarine forces.
But there is a more fundamental issue than the use of DESERT
SHIELD as a model for future combat operations--that is the necessity for die
United States to retain the capability to mobilize forces in a region to demon-
strate national will, to control the escalation of a crisis, and, most
importantly, to deter combat whenever possible. That requires the full
range of options inherent in the new National Security Strategy under the
category of "crisis response"—as opposed to the emphasis of the strategy of a
year ago simply on "force projection."
Crisis response, as it was introduced by President Bush in Aspen,
Colorado, implies the ability to respond in any manner appropriate and
available to compel or deter an adversary from an undesirable course of
action. A sufficient response in some cases may be merely the threat, of
actual imposition of economic or diplomatic sanctions, or the posturing of a
credible military force in the region to demonstrate to an adversary the
futility of military action. All of these options were attempted in the case of
Libya in 1966, and in the case of Iraq in 1990. In both cases, those actions
proved inadequate to deter further aggression, and overwhelming U.S. force

was thus required to resolve the crisis. The point is that all options were
exhausted before the U.S. resorted to force.
Continued success in both diplomatic and military endeavors is
contingent on U.S. capability to do more than simply impose punishment on
its adversaries in the form of surgical military strikes. At the same time,
the continued protection of U.S. interests in areas of the world which cannot
support a sophisticated combat presence—or its logistic train—for even a
relatively short duration dictates that the U.S. maintain a capability to
operate in remote regions, independent of its national support structure.
For both reasons the U.S. must continue to rely on its naval forces—
as it has over the last forty -five years --to demonstrate U.S. commitment to
global and regional stability when those conditions exist and to demonstrate
U.S. intentions and capabilities as a prelude to actual combat—when regional
stability is threatened. The important consideration for naval planning in
the future will be to ensure that the inherent dangers and limitations of the
use of naval force are recognized at the outset, and that "gunboat diplomacy"
remains a last resort rather than the expedient of choice.

APPENDIX 1
CHRONOLOGY OF U. S. INTERVENTION IN BEIRUT
17 MARCH 62 - 30 MARCH 64
(Source: Foreign Affairs Spring 1962, 1963, 1964 and Report of the DoD
Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act. Oct. 2 s. 196 % )
1962 17 Mar U. S. sends 670 soldiers to join 1 1 -nation peacekeeping force
which is to follow Israeli withdrawal rrorn the Sinai on 25 Apr.
6 Jun Israeli forces invade Lebanese territory and reach the
outskirts of Beirut within three days.
9 Jun Israeli Air Forces launch massive, successful attack against
Syrian SAM sites in Bekaa valley,
23 Jun 32d U. S. Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) deploys off Lebanon.
24 Jun U. S. Embassy in Beirut closes. U. S. citizens are evacuated
from the port city of Juniyah by 32d MAU.
26 lun U. S. vetoes UNSC resolution demanding limited Israeli and
Palestinian withdrawal from west Beirut.
16 Jul U. S. suspends the sale of cluster artillery shells to Israel.
1 Aug Truce collapses as Israeli forces mount fierce bombardment of
Beirut. U. S. Ambassador Habib negotiates a cease-fire.
12 Aug UNSC unanimously adopts resolution demanding that Israel
permit UN officers to monitor cease-fire violations in Beirut.
25 Aus" First U.S. Marine peacekeeping forces land in Beirut.
14 Sep Lebanese President-elect Bashir Gemayal is assassinated.
1 6 Sep Reports emerge that hundreds of Palestinians have been killed
in Shabra and Shatiila refugee camps by Lebanese Christian
militiamen allowed into the area by Israeli authorities.
20 Sep Lebanon requests U. S., France and Italy return peacekeeping
forces to Beirut which had been removed on 10 Sep.
29 Sep 32d MAU lands at Port of Beirut as part of multinational force.
1 Nov President Reagan expands U. S. peacekeeping duties to include
patrols of East Beirut, and doubles the size of U. S. force.
2
1
Dec U. S. Marine Mobile Training Teams begin training Lebanese
Army Forces in rapid -reaction tactics.
1963 16 Jan UNSC extends term of UN multinational forces for six months.
2S Jan Israel orders its troops in Lebanon to avoid contact, with US
peacekeeping forces in order to alleviate growing frictions.
2 Feb U.S. Marine draws his pistol in effort to force withdrawal of
3 Israeli tanks from U. S. guard post.

6 Feb Israeli commission releases report recommending dismissal or
censure for role of Israeli officials, including Defense Minister
Sharon, in massacres at Shabra and Shatilla refugee camps.
1 j Feb Lebanese army takes complete control of Beirut for first time
in 8 years as Christian militias withdraw.
15 Apr Terrorist bomb damages U. S. Embassy in Beirut, killing 63,
including 17 Americans.
4 May Secy of State Schultz successfully negotiates an agreement
for withdrawal of Israeli troops.
20 May U. S. lifts ban on sale of 75 F- 16 fighters to Israel imposed
after Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1962.
2.3 Jul Walid Jumblatt, leader of the Progressive Socialist Party
announces formation of a Syrian-backed "'National Salvation
Front." to oppose the 17 May Israeli-Lebanese agreement,
28 Auq U. S. Marines return fire for the first, time against a rnortar
attack originating from Druze positions.
29 Aug Two U. S. Marines are killed and 14 wounded as Lebanese
Army clashes with Muslim Militiamen.
1 Sep President Reagan orders 2000-man Marine reinforcement unit
into Mediterranean to stand by off Beirut.
3 Sep Israel withdraws forces from Shouf Mountains; positions are
later taken up by Druze militiamen.
7 Sep U. S. carrier -based F- 14s conduct first photo-reconnaissance
flights to identify opposing force locations.
6 Sep U.S. naval guns fire on Druze positions to protect U.S. forces.
13 Sep U. S. authorizes Marine peacekeeping forces to call in naval
gunfire and air strikes to protect their positions.
17 Sep U. S. naval guns fire for first time on targets in Syrian-held
Lebanon; Syria warns it will return any fire on its positions.
19 Sep U. S. destroyers shell Druze positions in hills above Beirut;
White House defends move as "vital to safety" of U. S
peacekeeping force; France criticizes the U. S. action.
20 Sep Congress authorizes extending U. S. Marines in Lebanon, avert-
ing a confrontation with President over 1973 War Powers Act.
22 Sep French combat planes attack anti-government positions east of
Beirut in retaliation for shelling of French headquarters.
19 Oct Four U. S. Marines are wounded when convoy of U. S. peace-
keeping force is attacked by remotely-detonated car bomb.
23 Oct 24 1 U. S. Marines and Navy personnel are killed in suicide
truck-bomb attack against barracks of U. S. peacekeeping
forces in Beirut; near-simultaneous attack against French
compound leaves 56 killed.
4 Nov Third truck-bomb attack destroys Israeli headquarters in

Tyre, Lebanon, killing 60 persons; Israelis retaliate by striking
Palestinian positions in mountains east of Beirut.
17 Nov French warplanes attack bases of pro -Iranian guerrillas in
eastern Lebanon in retaliation for attack on French barracks.
24 Nov Israel exchanges 4500 captured Palestinian and Lebanese
guerillas for 6 Israeli soldiers held by PLC).
4 Dec U. S. carrier-based combat planes attack Syrian positions in
Lebanon in response to Syrian attacks on unarmed U. S.
reconnaissance aircraft on 3 Dec. Eight Marines are killed by
artillery nre rrom Syrian-backed militiamen near Beirut.
19 Dec House Armed Services Committee panel charges Marine com-
manders with "serious errors" which permitted successful
terrorist attack against Marine headquarters.
2 6' Dec DoD Commission reports that serious security and intelligence
errors permitted terrorist attack on Marine Headquarters in
Beirut. Commission recommends a reassessment of U.S.
military role and diplomatic options in Lebanon.
1964 3 Jan Pentagon acknowledges that up to 700 troops of the 1600-man
U.S. peacekeeping force in Beirut are routinely transferred to
naval vessels offshore for safety at night.
7 Jan 2 U. S. Marines are wounded by artillery fire near Beirut air-
port. U. S. Marine corporal is killed by ambush the next day.
30 Jan Shelling of U.S. outpost in Beirut kills one Marine, wounds 3-
7 Feb President Reagan orders redeployment of U.S. peacekeeping
forces to ships off Lebanese coast, and authorizes air, naval
strikes against militia positions near Beirut.
6 Feb Battleship New jersey fires 250 16 -inch shells against pro-
Syrian militia positions near Beirut.
UK withdraws its peacekeeping forces from Beirut,
13 Feb U.S. ships evacuate Lebanese Army units stranded by Druse
offensive south of Lebanon.
15 Feb White House announces plan for withdrawal of U. S. peace-
keeping forces from Beirut by 15 March.
2 1 Feb U.S. forces begin redeployment to ships offshore; withdrawal
completed by 26 Feb.
14 Mar King Hussein of Jordan denounces U. S. policy for pro-Israeli
bias, and rejects peace negotiations with Israel.
24 Mar France announces decision to withdraw peacekeeping troops
from Beirut,; completed 31 Mar.





CHRONOLOGY OF U. S. NAVAL OPERATIONS IN
GULF OF SIDRA, LIBYA AUGUST 1961-APRIL 1966
(Source: Foreign Affairs Spring 1960-67; U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
May 1967; Col. W. H. Hays, USMC, "Crossing the Line/' U. S. Naval Institute
Proceedings. November 1966.)
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
1973 Oct Kadhaffi declares Gulf of Sidra south of 32-30 North to be
Libyan territorial waters.
1974 Feb U.S. State Department declares Libyan proclamation to be a
violation of international lav/.
1979 Dec U.S. Embassy in Tripoli is sacked by mob while Libyan
security forces look on. Kadhaffi ignores U.S. protest.
1 960 Jul President Reagan, in speech before the American Bar Assn.,
denounces Iran, Libya, North Korea, Cuba and Nicaragua
as "outlav/ states" who sponsor worldwide terrorism.
Sep 2 Libyan Mig-23s make an unsuccessful attack on USAF RC-
135 on reconnaissance mission north of 32-30N.
196
1
Aug U.S. State Department receives intelligence that Libyan agents
in U.S. are actively pinpointing locations of U.S. govt officials.
Aug U.S. Battlegroup consisting of IfSSForestall and USSNimitz
commences Freedom of Navigation exercise in op -area
extending south of 32
-.3 ON. During four-day exercise two
Libyan SU-22s are downed by U.S. F-14s.
1962 Mar U.S. imposes embargo on Libyan oil products and curtails
sales of high-technology equipment to Libya.
1964 Apr London policeman is killed by terrorist firing from third floor
of Libyan Peoples' Bureau. Great Britain closes the embassy
and severs diplomatic relations with Libya.
Jul 16 ships strike mines in Red Sea apparently laid by Libyan
cargo ferry Ghat
1 965 Jun TWA Flight enroute Beirut is hijacked by terrorists who kill
USN Petty Officer. 39 x^mericans are held aboard after other
passengers are released.
Jul U.S. expels attache of Libyan mission to U.N. after FBI data
links him to plot to assassinate Libyan dissidents in U.S.
Oct PLO terrorists board Adtiite Lauro and kill one U.S. citizen.

Supervision in planning the attack is traced to Libya.
1955 Nov EgyptAir Flight enroute Cairo is diverted to Malta by terror-
ists who kill 2 Israelis and 3 Americans.
Dec Abu Nidal terrorists, using passports confiscated from Mor-
roccan laborers in Libya, kill 20 civilians in Rome and Vienna
airports. Libya grants safe haven to Nidal.
EVENTS PRECEDING THE U.S. USE OF FORCE
1966 7 Jan Via Executive Order, President Reagan orders all U.S. citizens
to leave Libya, and declares "appropriate penalties upon
return to the U.S." for those choosing to ignore the order.
Ban on all U.S. trade with Libya is announced.
8 Jan U.S. State Dept. issues report to allies detailing Libyan links
to terrorist incidents and training. U.S. freezes Libyan assets
in U.S., estimated at $2.5 billion.
9 Jan Italy bans arms sales to Libya.
Canada cancels transfers of drilling technology to Libya.
20 Jan Asst Secy of State John Whitehead is dispatched to present
U.S. position to heads of state of Britain, GDR, Italy, France,
Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands.
2 6 Jan EEC members agree to ban arms sales to countries "clearly
implicated m supporting terrorism."
20 Mar Kadhaffi hosts convention of 256 extremist political groups.
2.3 Mar U.S. commences Freedom of Navigation exercise which in-
cludes incursions into Libyan "territorial waters" south of
32-30. by 127 ships of three carrier battlegroups.
24 Mar Libya unsuccessfully launches two SA-5 missiles at F- 14s,
followed by two more SA-5s and one SA-2 later that day.
Libyan actions are declared hostile by CVBG commander.
U.S. aircraft then sink a Libyan PBM and neutralize Surt
SAM radar installation.
25 Mar Nanuchka PBM is attacked and damaged by two A-6Es
after displaying hostile intent,
27 Mar After 75 hours of unimpeded operations, exercise is termina-
ted and all U.S. warships depart.
3 Apr Bomb explodes on TWA flight enroute Athens from Rome,
killing 4 Americans. Kadhaffi congratulates the terrorists.
5 Apr Bomb explodes in LaBelle discotheque in Berlin, killing 2 and
injuring 230. U.S. intelligence later intercepts Libyan
telephone calls confirming that Libyan forces had planned
and executed the bombing. Information is passed by U.S.
to British and West German governments who characterize

the information as 'compelling."
7 Apr Egyptian govt rejects and publicly reveals U.S. overtures to
join forces in joint attack on Libya, deliberations for which
iau Deen in progress ioi previous eigni munuis.
8 Apr Bomb explodes aboard TWA flight from Rome to Athens.
Four Americans aboard are killed.
1 Apr President Reagan decides to proceed with strike against
Kadhaffi's terrorist training camps and military support
organization. Planning for a military strike against selected
Libyan targets begins in earnest at JCS, NSA.
1 2 Apr UN Ambassador Vernon Walters is dispatched to London,
Bonn, Paris and Rome to solicit joint support for further,
more stringent sanctions against Libya. Only the Thatcher
government responds favorably.
1 4 Apr EEC in emergency session approves sanctions against Libya
including forced reduction in embassy personnel and tighter
visa restrictions against Libyan diplomatic corps.
CHRONOLOGY OF U.S. AIR STRIKE AGAINST TRIPOLI
(based on Eastern Standard time)
14 Apr 1200 President Reagan approves the strike mission against five
selected Libyan military targets.
1213 26 KC- 10s and KC- 135s take off from RAF Mildenhall for
refuelling rendezvous points in Atlantic and Mediterranean.
1236 24 F- 1 1 Is take off from RAF Lakenheath;
5 F- 1 1 Is take off from RAF Upper Heyford.
1600 VPres. Bush meets with State, Defense, NSA, DC I, and CJCS.
Selected Senate and House leaders are briefed on the mission;
there are no dissenting voices.
1745 USSAmerica commences launching 6 A-6Es and 6 F/A- 16s.
USSCoral S&a launches 6 *AA-6Es and 6 F/A- 16s. Additional
aircraft include KA-6s, E-2Cs
s
and EA-6Bs. Strike control is
provided to F- 1 1 Is from E-2C controlled by l/ss Tjeonrf&vga.
1900-1912 Combined Strike force attacks the following targets:
(0200 local) -Benghazi Military Barracks and MiG assembly warehouse.
-Benina Airfield (suppression of M9G-2 3 air defenses).
-Aziziyah Military Barracks (Tripoli central command for
Libyan terrorist activities.
-Sidi Bilal Terrorist Training Camp in Tripoli.
-Tripoli Military Airfield
1953 America and Coral Sea recover all aircraft.
0310 USAF aircraft, return to home bases in Great Britain.
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(Source: Foreign Affairs. Spring 1967, 1966 and U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, May 1966, 1969)
1967 23 Mar US offers to extend military protection to Kuwaiti vessels
transiting through international waters in the Persian Gulf
against attack by Iran-Iraq war combatants.
6 Apr Kuwait proposes transferring the registration of Kuwaiti oil
tankers to American flag so US military vessels can protect
them in the Persian Gulf. Kuwaitis also seek to transfer
some tankers to Soviet registry.
14 Apr USSR announces it will lease 3 tankers to Kuwait to transport
oil through Persian Gulf, and raises possibility that Soviet
warships may escort, the tankers.
7 May Soviet freighter Ivan Eorot&y&v suffers minor damage in
attack by Iranian patrol boats in Persian Gulf near Dubai.
17 May USSStark is struck by 2 Exocet missiles fired by an Iraqi F-
1
Mirage fighter in the Persian Gulf near Bahrain, killing 37
crewmen.
16 May President Reagan puts American military vessels in the
region on heightened state of alert; Iraqi President Hussein
admits Iraqi planes are responsible and apologizes.
19 May Reagan Administration announces "general agreement" with
Kuwait to reflag 1 1 Kuwaiti oil tankers so they can be
escorted by US Navy vessels in Gulf.
2 1 May Senate votes 91-5 to require detailed security report from
the Administration before reflagging begins. Reflagging is
delayed until late June or July.
26 May The Washington Post reports that the USSR has dispatched 3
minesweepers to the Persian Gulf to join 2 Soviet frigates on
patrol there since 1966.
20 Jul UN Security Council unanimously approves Resolution 596,
calling for a cease-fire in Iran-Iraq war. Iraq declares its
reaction "positive"; Iran calls it a "vicious American diplo-
matic maneuver." USSR and China refuse to support proposed
arms embargo against violators of the resolution.

22 Jul Three US warships escort 2 reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers into
Persian Gulf in first test, of reflagging program.
24 Jul Tanker Bridget&n hits a mine while under US escort, causing
slight damage.
26 Jul US Defense Secretary Weinberger orders minesweeping heli-
copters into the Gulf. US later asks FRG, UK, France, Belgium
and Netherlands governments to send minesweeping gear.
4-7 Aug Iran holds naval maneuvers in Iranian territorial waters and
wartime "exclusion zone" in Gulf, allegedly training crews in
suicide missions using speedboats loaded witn explosives
6 Aug US Navy F- 14 fires 2 missiles at an Iranian fighter which had
displayed "hostile intent." Both missiles miss the target.
1 2 Aug UK and France agree to send minesweepers to the Persian
Gulf, but stipulate that they will lend assistance only to their
ovv
Tn shipping.
4 Sep Surface to surface missile strikes SW coast to Kuwait, damag-
ing houses and industrial facility. Kuwait accuses Iran of
launching missile and expels 7 Iranian diplomats.
1 1 Sep UN SecGen J.P. de Cuellar arrives in Tehran on peace-seeking
mission; Iran agrees to cease-fire only if UN identifies Iraq
as the aggressor; Iraq agrees if Iran drops its; demand.
15 Sep Italy, Belgium send minesweepers to Gulf. By mid-October
largest international fleet assembled since Korean war is in
Gulf, including vessels from US, USSR, UK, France, Italy,
Belgium and the Netherlands.
2 1 Sep US helicopter attacks Iranian amphibious vessel allegedly
laying mines in international waters, killing 5 crewmen and
wounding 4. US warships rescue 26 Iranian crewmen the
next day and discover 10 mines on the disabled vessel.
6" Oct US helicopters attack 4 Iranian patrol boats in the Gulf after
they fire on a US surveillance helicopter. One Iranian boat is
sunk, two are disabled and seized. 2 crewmen are kilied.
16 Oct Iranian SilkwTorm missile strikes US-flagged tanker in Kuwaiti
waters, injuring 15 crewmen.
19 Oct. US destroyers shell Iranian offshore oil rig reputed to be a
gunboat base.
2 1 Oct US Senate passes resolution calling on President Reagan to
report to Congress within *,0 davs on his Gulf policv.i O -' t i t
26 Oct President Reagan bans by executive order all imports from
Iran and expands list of militarily significant items banned
from export, to Iran.

2 Nov US warship mistakenly fires on unarmed Arab fishing boat
mistaking it at night for Iranian gunboat. One Indian crew-
man is killed. US expresses regret for the incident.
6 Nov Emergency Arab League summit passes resolution condemns
Iran's continuation of war and expressing support for Iraq.
1966 30 Mar Iranian gunboats fire on a Kuwaiti military base on Bubiyan
island in first known clash between Iranian and Kuwaiti
armed forces.
14 Apr 14 crewmen are injured when USSSamu&15. Roberts strikes
a mine in Persian Gulf near Bahrain. US Navy later locates
and destroys 2 mines similar to type known to have been
used by Iranian forces.
16 Apr US warships shell 2 Iranian oil platforms used as radar sta-
tions. Later that day US naval forces sink or disable six
Iranian ships which had earlier attacked American vessels.
26 Apr Saudi Arabia severs diplomatic relations with Iran to protest
1967 riot by Iranian pilgrims in Mecca and continuing
Iranian harrassrnent of Gulf shipping.
3 Jul While engaged in surface skirmish against Iranian gunboats,
cruiser l/SS Yinc&nn&s mistakes Iranian commercial Airbus
for attacking F- 14, and downs it with two missiles, killing
estimated 290 persons aboard.
1 1 Jul US offers to pay compensation to families of victims of Iran
Air 655.
16 Jul In letter to UN SecGen, President Khavanei of Iran accepts UN
Security Council Resolution 595 calling for immediate cease-
fire between Iran and Iraq, and withdrawal to internationally
recognized borders.
2 Jul UN Security Council unanimously adopts resolution expressing
"deep distress" over shooting of civilian aircraft.
6 Aug UN SecGen de Cuellar announces that Iran and Iraa have
accepted UN peace proposal.
20 Aug Cease-fire between Iran and Iraq official begins, ending the
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